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B.Sc., RENSSELAER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE
M.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Patrick Kelly and Professor Dennis Goeckel
This dissertation investigates covert communication in dynamic wireless commu-
nication environments. A key goal is to provide insight about the capabilities of a
transmitter desiring to remain covert and analogously, the capabilities of the party
attempting to detect covert communications. The first chapter provides background
on covert communications prior to this work. The second chapter studies the the-
oretical limits of covert communication and proves that positive rate is achievable
when a jammer is added to the classical Alice/Bob/Warden Willie model. The third
chapter expands on the second chapter by considering more generally the impact of
the dynamics of the environment on the Alice/Bob/Warden Willie model. The dy-
namics of the environment generate uncertainty at Willie even if the jammer does not
vary his/her power or even if Willie employs an antenna array to mitigate the jam-
ming. The fourth and fifth chapters investigate the impact of considering the exact
ix
continuous-time model rather than a discrete-time model approximation. In partic-
ular, detectors at Willie which leverage information in the continuous-time domain
outperform detectors based on the discrete-time model approximation. The fourth
and fifth chapters consider the continuous-time model of the Alice/Bob/Willie sce-
nario and the Alice/Bob/Willie/Jammer scenarios respectively. The fourth and fifth
chapters may appear to question the results of Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and prior wireless
covert communication related research. However, these final chapters provide insight
about different detectors available to Willie and the importance of Alice implementing
communication schemes which do not contain features that significantly differ from
Willie’s observation under the null hypothesis. Our work has demonstrated how the
covert throughput critically depends on Willie’s knowledge of the environment and
how the covert transmitter, allies in the area, or the dynamics of the environment
itself might impact that knowledge. Future work will continue to move covert commu-
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Prior research in wireless covert communications analyzed the fundamental theo-
retical limits of covert communications when a wireless transmitter wants to reliably
communicate to a legitimate recipient without risk of detection by a watchful adver-
sary. A key finding is that the transmitter can only transmit O(√n) covert bits in n
channel uses in order to maintain covert and reliable communication to the intended
recipient [1]. This dissertation builds upon this prior work in covert communications.
Chapter 2 considers the addition of a jammer and demonstrates that the addition of
the jammer creates uncertainty at the adversary’s receiver. This additional uncer-
tainty allows the legitimate transmitter to send O(n) covert bits in n channel uses
reliably to the legitimate receiver. Both additive white Gaussian noise and finite
block fading channels are considered in Chapter 2.
The third chapter expands on results in Chapter 2 by considering more generally
a dynamic environment which generates fading variations on the adversary’s observa-
tions. Research presented in Chapter 2 assumes that all devices in the environment
are stationary and that fading variations are finite over the duration of the codeword
length which the transmitter sends. However, dynamic environments such as urban
environments or electronic warfare scenarios, may cause the adversary to observe
large degrees of fading variations due to the channel conditions or the movement
of entities in the model. The ability for a legitimate transmitter to communicate
covertly in dynamic channel conditions is considered in the third chapter. The fading
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variations observed at the adversary varies as a function of the codeword length of
the transmitters codeword.
The fourth and fifth chapters consider the continuous-time models. The fourth
chapter considers the Alice/Bob/Willie scenario and the fifth chapter considers the
Alice/Bob/Willie/Jammer scenario. Prior research as well as work presented in Chap-
ter 2 and Chapter 3 analyze covert communications based on the discrete-time model.
The equivalent discrete-time model is an approximation of the continuous-time model
and is generally assumed to contain sufficient information to represent the continuous-
time model. However, the discrete-time model assumes Willie can determine the exact
time instances to sample his continuous-time observation. This assumption is not al-
ways valid and the continuous-time model is capable of modeling when Willie does
not know when to sample. For example, in Chapter 2, a power detector is proven
to be an optimal detector based on the equivalent discrete-time model; however,
the power detector is not always the optimal detector based on the continuous-time
model. Therefore, the fourth and fifth chapters investigate whether the “equivalent
discrete-time model” is in fact an equivalent discrete-time model when analyzing
covert communications.
The sixth and final chapter concludes with a summary of the work presented in
this dissertation as well as suggestions for future work based on the findings herein.
1.1 Motivation
The desire for two parties to communicate without a third party (an adversary)
understanding the content of their communication has existed for many ages. To pre-
vent adversaries from understanding messages between legitimate transmitters and
receivers, legitimate parties can use encryption to hide the content of their messages.
Encryption is the act of encoding original messages (plaintext) into a ciphertext us-
ing a secret key with the aim that an adversary is not capable of extracting the
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original message. Some of the earliest instances of encryption can be traced back
to 1900 BC [2]. Since 1900 BC, the sophistication of encryption schemes have im-
proved drastically. However, classic cryptography has an underlying consistent design
characteristic that may hinder maintaining the privacy of messages that use classic
cryptography. Classic cryptography is designed so the decoding process is “easy”
for the intended recipient and preferably “hard” for any eavesdropper. However, ad-
vancements in technology have allowed adversaries to develop strategies to decode
(i.e. break) encrypted messages. As a result, legitimate transmitters and receivers
make further technological improvements by designing more sophisticated encryption
protocols. Standards for secure crypto systems are constantly evolving due to the
cyclic nature of legitimate users attempting to maintain successful encrypted com-
munications and adversaries attempting to break encryptions.
A popular historical example of an adversary breaking an encryption scheme is the
decoding of the German Code Enigma by Allied powers in the 1940s [2]. Researchers
and mathematicians were able to break the Engima code using ciphertext obtained
from German radio transmissions. Each day, ciphertext messages were observed in
the morning and analyzed using machines to determine the ciphertext key. As a re-
sult, Allied powers were able to decode encrypted German transmissions that were
later sent throughout the day. There are many instances throughout history when
adversaries decode messages using a known ciphertext or advances in computational
power to develop deciphering algorithms. In recent decades, some cryptographic
schemes such as Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) [3] and Data Encryption Standard
(DES) [4] have become obsolete due to advances in computational power. Such tech-
nological advances align with Moore’s Law which states that advances in hardware
are expected and so the ability of adversaries to break encryption schemes is not un-
expected. Quantum computing is also a maturing research area and once successful
may make all modern day cryptography obsolete [5–8]. However, it is assumed that
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new encryption schemes would be developed to operate under quantum conditions
which is also currently an open area of research. Some other notable cases of adver-
saries breaking encrypted messages can be found in The Code Book: The Science of
Secrecy from Ancient Egypt to Quantum Cryptography by Signh [2] and The Code-
breakers: The Comprehensive History of Secret Communication from Ancient Times
to the Internet by Kahn [9] which may be of further historical interest.
Even if adversaries cannot acquire the ciphertext or exploit computational re-
sources to decipher encrypted messages, there are still strategies adversaries can em-
ploy to learn information about message content hidden in a ciphertext. These types
of attacks are called side-channel attacks and an example attack strategy is the use
of meta-data to infer message content. Exploiting meta-data to learn about mes-
sage content has been well established by Edward Snowden [10]. Edward Snowden
disclosed that even if the government of United States of America does not have ac-
cess to the content within a communication, government agencies are still capable
of extracting information about the message content by leveraging meta-data. For
example, knowing the two parties involved in a phone call, the length of the call,
and the frequency at which two parties converse may be used to learn about what is
discussed during a phone call without actually hearing any of the conversation.
To summarize, there are two potential drawbacks of classical cryptography that
are highlighted thus far: 1) technological advances by adversaries may place current
and past encrypted communications at risk; and 2) meta-data can be exploited as a
side-channel attack to infer message content without direct access to content within a
communication. Given these vulnerabilities, developing strategies for legitimate par-
ties to send messages covertly without detection by an adversary is of great interest.
Covert communication occurs when two legitimate parties are able to communicate
without an adversary detecting their communications. If users communicate covertly,
adversaries cannot exploit meta-data or collect ciphertext with the goal of developing
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strategies to decode the encrypted messages at a later date. Cryptography should
still be used in conjunction with covert strategies communications, however, research
is needed to determine under what conditions covert communication can be achieved
or thwarted.
There are many relevant applications for the adoption of covert wireless commu-
nication in modern day wireless communications. Covert wireless communication has
obvious military applications such as providing additional cover when soldiers are
deployed in theater and need to keep their presence hidden. There are also instances
when governments may want to prevent or monitor social unrest by monitoring wire-
less communications. Determining the limits of covert communication helps adver-
saries evaluate their detection capabilities and analogously, communicating parties
can evaluate their ability to achieve covert and reliable communication.
1.2 Background
Modern day wireless covert communications research has been revitalized due
to work by Bash, Goeckel and Towsley in [11]. In [11], Bash et al. consider the
communication scenario (shown in Figure 1.1) where a transmitter (Alice) would like
to send a message to legitimate receiver (Bob) in the presence of an eavesdropper
(Willie the Warden). The nomenclature Warden is used instead of Eve because the
Warden’s role differs from Eve’s in classic cryptographic scenarios. Eve’s role is
to extract the hidden content in encrypted messages that are shared between Alice
and Bob. However, the Warden’s sole task is to detect if any communication is
occurring between Alice and Bob. If all channels experience additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN), the Square Root Law (SRL) presented in [11] states that Alice can
only transmit O(√n) covert bits reliably to Bob in n channel uses. If Alice tries
to transmit bits at a higher rate, then she risks being detected by Willie with high
probability. If she tries to transmit any fewer bits, then Bob cannot successfully
5
decode her messages with small probability of error. Throughout the remainder of
this work, covert communication refers to covert and reliable communication such
that Bob can successfully reconstruct Alice’s message with minimum error without
Warden Willie detecting she transmitted a message.
Figure 1.1. Alice, Bob and Warden Willie model under AWGN channel conditions.
Essentially, there is a balance that must be maintained for Alice to achieve covert
communication. As an example, consider a very simple situation such as Alice talking
with her voice. Alice must talk “quiet” enough such that Willie cannot detect her
communications, yet “loud” enough so Bob can understand what she is saying.
Since [11], there have been many research contributions that study modern day
covert wireless communication. Bash et al. in [1] and [12] performed optical experi-
ments which support the theoretical results found in [11]. The SRL is also valid when
an adversary has access to quantum technology which was demonstrated by Bash et
al. in [13]. Additionally, covert communication over channel models such as Binary
Symmetric Channels (BSCs) are considered by Che et al. in [14, 15]. More generi-
cally, Discrete Memoryless Channels (DMCs) are considered by Wang et al. in [16,17].
These works demonstrate that the SRL also holds in BSCs and DMCs.
The models presented in [1,11–13,16,17] assume Alice and Bob pre-share a secret
key that is unknown to Willie. The necessary key length to covertly communicate in
a generalized channel model is studied further by Bloch in [18]. Results show that
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if the Alice-to-Bob channel is better than the Alice-to-Willie channel, then the SRL
holds without requiring Alice and Bob to pre-share a secret key. However, if such
channel conditions are not satisfied, then Alice can satisfy the SRL with a key of
length O(√n).
1.2.1 Increasing the Rate of Covert Communications
All of the references noted thus far have shown that Alice can only transmitO(√n)
covert bits in n channel uses for various channel conditions. Therefore, there is great
interest to determine how covert communication at a positive rate (O(n) bits in n
channel uses) can be achieved. To achieve positive rate, researchers started assuming
that Willie has uncertainty in the system model.
In [19], Bash et al. consider if Willie has uncertainty about when Alice trans-
mits in T (n) available slots. Per [19], Alice can communicate covertly and reliably
O(min{√n log(T (n)), n}) bits in n channel uses if Alice and Bob pre-arrange a time
to communicate. These results show that Alice and Bob can increase their rate of
covert and reliable communication; however, the rate is still not positive. The desire
to achieve positive rate (O(n) bits in n channel uses) while also maintaining covert
communication motivated future research efforts. Lee and Baxley found that Alice
can achieve positive rate if: 1) Willie employs a power detector (i.e. a radiometer)
and 2) Willie has uncertainty about the noise power at his receiver [20–22].
Lee and Baxley’s work makes a positive and important contribution; however,
their results rely on assumptions about Willie’s receiver and do not hold in practical
scenarios. For example, assume Alice is assigned a single time slot to transmit out
of many available time slots and that no other communication is occurring by any
parties during the time slots that Alice does not transmit to Bob. Goeckel et al. in [23]
show that even if Willie has uncertainty about his noise variance, Willie can use the
time slots when Alice does not transmit to estimate his noise variance and reduce
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his uncertainty. As a result, Alice’s covert throughput is limited to the same as
when Willie knows his noise variance. This result holds even when Willie does not
know the time slot that Alice and Bob agree to communicate in. Therefore, adding
uncertainty at Willie is important for achieving positive rate, but, practical scenarios
must be considered. Such scenarios are considered in this work by including a jammer
in the communication model. Also in this work, covert communication over fading
channels is investigated in addition to AWGN channels when a jammer is included in
the model.
1.2.2 Considering the Continuous-Time Model
As more complex channels are considered, this work also removes some important
assumptions at Willie’s receiver. For example, current research on covert wireless
communications assumes that Willie employs a discrete-time model to approximate
his continuous-time observations. This assumption only holds if Willie knows the
correct time instances to sample his continuous-time observations. However, if Willie
does not know the correct time instances to sample, then existing research proves that
a power detector is not optimal. For example, wireless waveforms often have periodic
features and a detector designed to identify specific frequencies allows for waveform
specific detectors.
Cyclostationary Detectors (CSDs) are a set of detectors that exploit the periodic
features of signals of interest to perform detection. William Gardner performed exten-
sive research on CSDs and the optimal CSDs for various modulation schemes [24–27].
If Willie has limited resources, a power detector is a feasible solution [28]. However,
if Willie has knowledge of Alice’s waveform structure or the capability to search over
different cyclic frequencies, a power detector is not optimal. Before analyzing the
covert rate of communications in a continuous-time model, it is first important to
understand the optimal detector to detect continuous-time signals.
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Carrara and Adams in [29] assume that a power detector is optimal if Alice trans-
mits signals which are continuous and band-limited. In [29], the authors do not state
that Alice employs a Gaussian codebook or what specific type of continuous-time
signal she transmits. There is also no consideration for how Alice maps her discrete-
time symbols to the continuous-time domain. Modeling the mapping is important
because wireless signals in continuous-time often exhibit features, which Willie can
leverage to design detectors. For example, continuous-time wireless waveforms are of-
ten pulse shaped to reduce intersymbol interference (ISI) or modulated using a carrier
frequency [30, Chapter 3.3, Chapter 4]. Therefore, when considering continuous-time
signals, the detector which best exploits any unique features in Alice’s signal should
be employed instead of assuming a power detector is the optimal detector. Also, Bash
et al. in [12] acknowledged the importance of considering continuous-time model in
early work. This work investigates the impact of detectors based on the continuous-
time model. Both the Alice/Bob/Willie and the Alice/Bob/Willie/Jammer scenarios
are re-evaluated using the continuous-time model.
1.3 Contributions
1.3.1 Adding a Jammer to the Communication Model
In this work, the addition of a jammer to the Alice, Bob, Willie model is consid-
ered to help facilitate covert communication under various channel conditions. The
jammer is uninformed and does not know when or even if Alice transmits in her
agreed upon time slot to transmit to Bob. In addition, all parties are synchronized.
Results in this work show that the inclusion of the jammer allows Alice to achieve pos-
itive rate covert communication for any detector at Willie. In particular, prior work
in covert wireless communication assumed that a radiometer (i.e. power detector) is
an optimal detector. In contrast, we prove that a radiometer is indeed optimal in
AWGN and single block fading models. However, if the Alice-to-Willie channel or the
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jammer-to-Willie channel is subject to a finite number of multiple fading coefficients
in a single time slot, the radiometer is no longer an optimal detector. But we model
the structure of an optimal detector and show that Alice can still achieve positive rate.
1.3.2 Considering Dynamic Channels in the Communication Model
Covert communication proofs presented in Chapter 2 assume the jammer is sta-
tionary. However, a moving jammer that transmits with constant power in a single
block fading environment also generates variations in the power observed by Willie
according to the jammer’s movement. Additionally, there are instances when a dy-
namic environment also causes fading variations. The mathematical formulation of
dynamic channels may first appear similar to the finite multiple block fading scenario
presented in Chapter 2. However, this portion of the dissertation generalizes the dy-
namics to include when the fading variations are a function of the total number of
symbol slots observed by Willie. Generalizing the number of variations as a function
of the codeword length, n, helps provide insight about the rate Alice should employ
in order to achieve covert communication. For example, Alice must abide by the SRL
in order to remain covert when the jammer’s power observed by Willie does not vary
at all. However, the work presented in Chapter 2 demonstrates that a fixed number
of variations which occur over n allow Alice to communicate covertly. Therefore,
modeling the number of fading variations as a function of the codeword length allows
for the analysis of covert communications in various wireless environments.
1.3.3 Covert Communication on the Continuous-Time Model
Work presented in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and research presented in the Back-
ground Section are based on a discrete-time communications model. The underlying
assumption in prior work is that the discrete-time model is an equivalent approxi-
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mation of the continuous-time model. Chapter 4 re-evaluates the Alice/Bob/Willie
covert communication scenario employing the continuous-time model instead of the
discrete-time model to determine if in fact, the discrete-time model is an “equiva-
lent” discrete-time model. Covert communications in the continuous-time model is
re-evaluated by assuming that Willie employs a cyclostationary detector (CSD) in-
stead of a power detector to detect Alice’s signal. Results demonstrate that the CSD
designed based on the continuous-time model outperforms the power detector. Based
on these results, the discrete-time model employed in prior work is not an equivalent
representation of the continuous-time model.
The Alice/Bob/Willie/Jammer presented in Chapter 2 is also re-evaluated based
on the continuous-time model in Chapter 5. The new model assumes that both Alice
and the jammer transmit pulse shaped signals with different timing offsets when their
signals arrive at Willie. A detector is then proposed that exploits the timing offset
differences to detect if Alice is transmitting. Results again demonstrate that if Willie
is unaware of Alice’s timing, the standard power detector is not optimal. Instead,
there exists a method for Willie estimate the jammer’s timing offset and develop a
detector that significantly outperforms a power detector. The goal of this work is
to help provide insight into how Alice can achieve covert communication by adding
uncertainty into Willie’s detector.
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CHAPTER 2
COVERT COMMUNICATION WITH THE ASSISTANCE
OF AN UNINFORMED JAMMER
2.1 Introduction
Much of secure communications centers on preventing an adversary from deter-
mining the content of the message. However, there are circumstances when com-
municating parties Alice and Bob may want covert communication: hiding the very
existence of their communication from a watchful adversary Willie. Examples include
communicating in the presence of an authoritarian government who may want to cur-
tail any organization by certain entities, or military communications where detection
might inform an adversary that there is activity in a given geographical area.
As defined precisely below, recent work has studied reliable covert communication,
which requires: (i) Willie’s error in detecting that Alice transmitted a message to
Bob be arbitrarily close to random guessing; and (ii) Bob’s error of recovering Alice’s
message be arbitrarily small. When the Alice-to-Bob and Alice-to-Willie channels
are additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels, [11] and [12] showed a square
root law (SRL): provided Alice and Bob share a secret of sufficient length prior to
transmission, Alice can communicate covertly to Bob if and only if she employs a
per-symbol power of no more than O(1/√n), which decreases to 0 in the limit of
large n. Thus, O(√n) bits (and no more) can be transmitted in n channel uses
[12]. Follow-on work has considered the length of the pre-shared secret in [14] and
[31], characterization of the constant hidden by Big-O notation in [31] and [32], and
both the theory and experimental verification of covert communication over quantum
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channels in [13] and [33]. Additional research by Soltani et al. in [34–36] has also
considered covert communication over networks.
Subsequent work considered whether positive rate covert communications, which
requires the transmission of O(n) bits in n channel uses, is possible. Lee et al. in [22]
demonstrated that positive rate is indeed achievable over AWGN channels if Willie
has uncertainty about the statistics of the background noise and is restricted to a
receiver that employs a threshold on the received power when attempting to detect
Alice. Che et al. in [15] proved that positive rate is achievable if Willie has uncertainty
in the parameters of the binary symmetric channel between Alice and himself. In [23],
the authors re-visit the results of [15] and [22]. Rather than starting with parametric
uncertainty in Willie’s knowledge of the noise statistics, [23] allows Willie to have
access to a large collection of inputs spanning many possible codeword slots and to
employ them in any way that he deems suitable. Then, the lack of knowledge of
channel statistics at Willie does not increase the order of the covert throughput from
Alice to Bob [23]. This is because Willie is able to use any “quiet” periods to estimate
the noise statistics of his receiver accurately and then detect if Alice is transmitting,
even if he does not know a priori the time at which Alice might transmit.
In this work, we allow Willie to have a general receiver, as in [23], but we seek
conditions under which Alice can transmit with power not decreasing in the block-
length n; in the case of an AWGN channel between Alice and Bob, this then achieves
the transmission of O(n) bits covertly in n channel uses. To do such, we add another
node to the environment, the “jammer”, who Willie knows is transmitting. For ex-
ample, this might be a jammer in an electronic warfare (EW) environment placed by
Alice and Bob, or, as discussed in Section 2.5, a jammer placed in the environment by
Willie for other security objectives. If this jammer randomly varies his/her transmit
power appropriately or if time-varying multipath fading causes sufficient variation,
channel estimation during periods outside the time period when Willie is attempting
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to detect Alice’s transmission cannot be used to estimate the statistics of the noise
impacting Willie’s receiver during the period of interest. Hence, the results of [23]
do not apply; rather, we arrive at a similar mathematical problem to that considered
in [22]. A limitation of the achievability results of [22] is that the power detector is not
established to be the optimal receiver for Willie; in fact, in the case of block fading
channels with multiple fading blocks per codeword, it is known to be sub-optimal.
Here, in contrast to [22], we establish covert communication against any detector that
Willie might employ.
We consider both additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) and standard block
fading channels. Note that the problem is readily solved if the jammer and Alice are
closely coordinated (i.e. , an “informed” jammer) by the following construction. Alice
generates a codebook by drawing codeword symbols independently from a Gaussian
distribution, and provides this codebook only to Bob as the shared secret. At the
time Alice starts to transmit a codeword, the jammer turns down the power of his
transmission of Gaussian noise, and then he turns it back up at the moment Alice
finishes transmitting. Willie is then unable to determine that any change has taken
place when Alice is transmitting. We are interested in the case where the jammer
and Alice do not coordinate. In the AWGN case, our construction has the jammer
randomly change his/her power of the Gaussian noise in each “slot” of n symbols,
where n is the codeword length used by Alice. By doing such, Willie is unaware of
the background noise to expect and it is plausible, particularly based on the work
of [22], that Alice should be able to achieve positive rate covert communication to
Bob. To establish this result rigorously against an arbitrary receiver at Willie, we first
establish that Willie’s optimal receiver is indeed a comparison of the received power
to a threshold, from which the achievability of positive rate covert communication
follows.
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We then consider a block fading channel with M fading blocks per codeword of
length n. If M = 1, we demonstrate that a threshold test on the total received power
in the codeword slot is the optimal detector at Willie, from which covert transmission
by Alice with power not decreasing in the blocklength n follows. When M > 1, a
threshold test on the total received power at Willie is sub-optimal. Thus, we first
establish a technical property on the structure of Willie’s optimal detector and then
show that this property suffices to establish the ultimate goal when the jammer-to-
Willie channel is an M > 1 block fading channel: Alice can covertly transmit with a
power that does not decrease with her blocklength n.
The main contributions o this chapter are:
1. The consideration of covert communication in the presence of an uninformed
jammer.
2. The demonstration of the optimality of a power detector at Willie for the AWGN
and M = 1 block fading cases, from which the ability of Alice to transmit
covertly with a power that does not decrease with her blocklength follows.
3. The demonstration of the ability for Alice to transmit covertly with a power
that does not decrease with her blocklength in the M > 1 block fading scenario,
even when Willie uses an optimal detector (which is not a power detector in
this case).
2.2 System Model and Metrics
2.2.1 System Model
Consider a scenario where Alice (“a”) would like to communicate covertly to
Bob (“b”) without detection by a warden Willie (“w”), and suppose a jammer (“j”)
is active in the environment who is willing to assist with this communication. The
geographic model is shown in Figure 2.1. The distances from Alice to Willie and Alice
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to Bob are denoted by da,w and da,b respectively. The distances from the jammer to
Willie and the jammer to Bob are dj,w and dj,b respectively.
This work considers Alice’s ability to transmit covertly in a slot equal to the
codeword length n and Willie’s ability to detect such a transmission in that slot. For
integer constant T > 0, consider a discrete-time channel with T slots, each of length n
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hence, Alice may (or may not) transmit for a duration of n symbols starting at time
k = 1, and Willie’s goal is to detect whether or not such a transmission took place
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since observations outside of k = 1, 2, . . . , n might be useful to Willie in estimating
aspects of the environment [23]. The jammer is “uninformed” in the sense that it
does not know if Alice transmits, and if Alice transmits, the jammer does not know
that Alice is going to use a slot starting at time k = 1.
Figure 2.1. Alice, Bob, Willie and Jammer Wireless communication scenario. With
the help of a jammer, Alice attempts to transmit covertly to Bob in the presence of
a watchful adversary Willie.
Alice transmits a message with probability p and if she decides to transmit, she
maps her message to the complex symbol sequence f = [f1, f2, . . . , fn] and sends it
in the t = 0 slot corresponding to symbols k = 1, 2, . . . , n. The jammer is allowed to
transmit continuously (in all symbols of all slots) subject only to an average power
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limitation of Pmax per symbol. Let the (complex) signal transmitted by the jammer






, where gt = [gtn+1, gtn+2, . . . , gtn+n] is the
vector of transmitted jamming signals sent during the tth slot, with the per symbol
power constraint E[|gk|2] ≤ Pmax.
Figure 2.2. Slot model diagram of Willie’s observations in AWGN channel condi-
tions. Representation of the indexing of nT symbol periods in T slots, each of length
n. Alice decides to transmit in slot t = 0 with probability p, and Willie attempts to
detect a transmission in that slot.
2.2.1.1 AWGN channel
Consider first the AWGN channel. Denote the collection of channel outputs at
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is a set of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) zero-mean complex Gaussian
random variables, each with variance E[|N (w)k |2] = σ2w.
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, where Yt = [Ytn+1, Ytn+2, . . . , Ytn+n] is the vector of observations collected






































is a set of i.i.d. zero-mean complex Gaussian random variables, each with variance
E[|N (b)k |2] = σ2b.
2.2.1.2 Block fading channel
Consider next the standard Rayleigh block fading channel, as shown in Figure
2.3. The fading is constant for a block of n/M symbols but changes independently
to a different value for the next block, where M is the number of fading blocks per
codeword slot [37]. Denote h
(x,y)
t,m , m = 1, . . . ,M as the (complex) fading coefficient
for the mth block during slot t between transmitter x and receiver y, where x is
either “a” (Alice) or “j” (jammer), and y is either “w” (Willie) or “b” (Bob). By
the Rayleigh fading assumption, h
(x,y)
t,m , m = 1, . . . ,M is assumed to be a zero mean
complex Gaussian random variable with E[|h(x,y)t,m |2] = 1 for all channels. The fading
processes affecting different transmitter-receiver pairs are assumed to be independent

































































Figure 2.3. Slot model diagram of Willie’s observations in multiple-block fading
channel conditions where x is either Alice or the jammer and y is either Willie or
Bob.
2.2.2 Metrics
Based on his observations over all time slots, Willie must determine whether Alice
transmitted in time slot t = 0. The null hypothesis (H0) is that Alice did not transmit
and the alternative hypothesis (H1) is that that Alice transmitted a message. Define
P (H0) = 1− p as the probability that Alice does not transmit and P (H1) = p as the
probability that Alice transmits in time slot t = 0, where the assumption is that p is
known to Willie (pessimistically) . Willie seeks to minimize his probability of error
Pe = (1−p)·PFA+p·PMD, where PMD and PFA are the probabilities of missed detection
and false alarm at Willie, respectively. Per [38], Pe ≥ min(p, 1 − p) · (PFA + PMD).
Hence, Alice achieves covert communication if, for any  > 0, PMD + PFA > 1−  for
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n sufficiently large.1 Alice can transmit covertly with power not decreasing in n if,
for any  > 0, there exists Pf > 0 not dependent on n (but possibly dependent on
) such that, as n→∞, a system employing power Pf is covert. Bob should also be
capable of reliably decoding Alice’s message [12]. Bob can reliably decode messages
from Alice if, for any δ > 0, his probability of error is less than δ for n sufficiently
large.
Assume that Willie has full knowledge of the statistical model: the parameters for
Alice’s random codebook generation and the jammer’s random interference genera-
tion, the noise variance σ2w, and in the case of fading on the Alice-to-Willie channel
or jammer-to-Willie link, the statistics of that fading. Thus, Willie’s test is between
two simple hypotheses for Alice’s transmission state, and he has complete statistical
knowledge of his observations when either hypothesis is true. Therefore, by apply-
ing the Neyman-Pearson (NP) criterion, the optimal test for Willie to minimize his








where γ = P (H0)/P (H1), and fZ˜|H1(·|H1) and fZ˜|H0(·|H0) are the probability density
functions (pdfs) for Willie’s observations over all slots given Alice transmitted in the
t = 0 slot or given Alice did not transmit in the t = 0 slot, respectively. As can be
inferred by the assumption of a power detector for Willie’s receiver in [22] and made
precise in the proof of Theorem 1 below, a desirable property for the likelihood ratio
Λ(·) to exhibit is monotonicity. In the remainder of this section, the approach for
establishing such a property that applies in our context is described.
1This guarantees that Willie’s probability of error is within  of the probability of error min(p, 1−
p) obtained if he ignores his observations and chooses the hypothesis H0 and H1 that was most likely
a priori.
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The concept of stochastic ordering [40] is employed to derive the desired mono-
tonicity results in a more streamlined fashion relative to our preliminary work in [41].
A random variable X is smaller than W in the likelihood ratio order (written as
X ≤lr W ) when fW (x)/fX(x) is non-decreasing over the union of their supports,
where fW (x) and fX(x) are their respective probability density functions. Consider a
family of pdfs {gθ(·), θ ∈ X} where X is a subset of the real line. Let X(θ) denote a
random variable with density gθ(·) for fixed parameter θ. Let Θ denote a random vari-
able with support X and probability distribution function FΘ(·); denote X(Θ) as the
random variable that is the mixture of the random variables X(θ) under distribution




gθ(x)dF (θ), x ∈ R. (2.8)
The following result regarding mixtures of random variables is employed to prove the
power detector is optimal for AWGN and single-block fading channel models.
Lemma 1. [Theorem 1.C.11 in [40]] Consider a family of probability density functions
{gθ(·), θ ∈ X} with X a subset of the real line. Let Θ0 and Θ1 denote random variables
with support in X and probability distribution functions F0(θ) and F1(θ), respectively.
Let W0 and W1 be random variables such that Wi =d X(Θi), i = 0, 1, (where =d is




gθ(x)dFi(θ), i = 0, 1;x ∈ R. (2.9)
If
X(θ) ≤lr X(θ′), θ ≤ θ′ (2.10)
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and
Θ0 ≤lr Θ1, (2.11)
then
W0 ≤lr W1. (2.12)
2.3 Adding Uncertainty at Willie with a Jammer
This subsection demonstrates that Alice and Bob can achieve covert communi-
cation with positive rate when a jammer is added to the communication model by
generating uncertainty at Willie’s receiver. Even if Willie employs a radiometer, which
is shown to be an optimal detector in AWGN and single block fading scenarios, Alice
and Bob can still achieve covert and reliable communication. In the multiple fading
block scenarios, the radiometer is no longer an optimal test statistic, however covert
communication at a positive rate can still be achieved if Willie employs an optimal
detector.
2.3.1 Achievability for the AWGN Model
Consider the case of additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels between all
nodes, with the slot boundaries between Alice, Willie, and the jammer synchronized,
and, as in [12], assume that Alice and Bob share a secret of unlimited length. A
construction for Alice and the jammer is provided, and then a power detector is
shown to be Willie’s optimal detector based on the construction. The transmission
of O(n) bits in n channel uses is then demonstrated. It is assumed that da,w and dj,w
are known to Alice, although it is readily apparent that a lower-bound to da,w and an
upper-bound to dj,w are sufficient to establish the results.
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Construction: Random coding arguments are employed to generate K codewords,
each of length n, by independently drawing symbols from a zero-mean complex Gaus-
sian distribution with variance Pf , where Pf is determined later. This codebook is
revealed to Alice and Bob, is used only once, and comprises the shared secret un-
known to Willie (and the jammer). If Alice decides to transmit in slot t = 0, she
selects the codeword corresponding to her message, sets fi to the i
th symbol of that
codeword, and transmits the sequence f1, f2, . . . , fn. The jammer, with knowledge of
the slot boundaries but without knowledge of whether Alice transmits in a given slot
(or at all), transmits a symbol drawn independently from a zero-mean complex Gaus-
sian distribution during each symbol period. However, the variance of this Gaussian
distribution is not constant; in particular, during the tth slot, the jammer draws each
of its symbols independently from a zero-mean Gaussian distribution with variance
E[|gtn+i|2] = P (j)t , i = 1, 2, . . . , n, with P (j)t changing between slots. The sequence of
variances employed across the slots, P
(j)
t , t = −T2 ,−T2 +1, . . . ,−1, 0, 1, . . . , T2−2, T2 − 1
is an i.i.d. sequence of uniform random variables on [0, Pmax], where Pmax, as defined
in Section 2.2.1, is the maximum average power per symbol that the jammer can
employ.
Per above, Alice’s codebook is only shared with Bob and thus is unknown to
Willie. However, Willie knows everything else about how the system is constructed,
including the length of the codeword n, the distribution from which the codeword
symbols are drawn (including Pf), the distribution of the jamming power (including
Pmax), the time of Alice’s potential transmission, and his distances from Alice and
the jammer. Next, the power detector is established as Willie’s optimal strategy for
detecting Alice’s transmission.
Lemma 2. Under assumptions of the AWGN model in Section 2.2.1.1, Willie’s op-
timal detector compares the total received power in slot t = 0 to a threshold.
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Proof: Consider Willie’s attempt to detect Alice during the slot t = 0 of interest.
Since the jammer’s power outside of this slot is independent of the jammer’s power
within the slot and since Willie knows σ2w, it is sufficient for Willie to consider the
vector of observations Z0 only within slot t = 0, as defined in Section 2.2.1. Hence,
to simplify notation, the slot index is dropped and we denote the input to Willie’s
receiver as Z = [Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn].
Given the assumptions of the lemma, the distribution of Z is complex Gaus-
sian. Under H0, Willie observes only the jamming signal in addition to background
noise. Under H1, Willie observes both the jamming signal and Alice’s transmis-
sion in addition to background noise. Let θ denote the variance of the power ob-
served due to Alice’s transmissions and the jammer’s signal and thus define Z(θ) =
[Z1(θ), Z2(θ), . . . , Zn(θ)], where Zi(θ) ∼ CN (0, σ2w + θ). Thus, H0 and H1 are distin-




1/ζ, 0 < θ ≤ Pmax/dαj,w, ρ = 0
1/ζ, σ2a < θ ≤ σ2a + Pmax/dαj,w, ρ = 1,
0, otherwise,
(2.13)
































i=1 |zi|2. Thus, by the Neyman-Fisher Factorization Theorem, the total
power Z(θ) =
∑n
i=1 |Zi(θ)|2 is a sufficient statistic for Willie’s test [42, Chapter 5.4].
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Let χ2l denote a chi-squared random variable with l degrees of freedom. Then Z(θ) =
(σ2w + θ)χ
2








The next steps show that Λ(·) is monotone. From the definition of a chi-squared
random variable, Z(θ) ≤lr Z(θ′) whenever θ ≤ θ′. In addition, applying the definition
of ≤lr to the densities of Θ0,Θ1 yields that Θ0 ≤lr Θ1. The application of Lemma 1






corresponding to a threshold test on the total received power.
Theorem 1. Under the assumptions of the AWGN model in Section 2.2.1.1, there ex-
ists a communication strategy for Alice, Bob, and the jammer whereby Alice transmits
O(n) bits in n channel uses reliably and covertly to Bob in the presence of Willie.
Proof: Construction: Alice and the jammer employ the construction given at the
beginning of Section 2.2.1. Per Lemma 2, the optimal detector for Willie is to employ








where τn ≡ Γn/n. Whereas there is an optimal τn for any finite n, this work establishes
for any sequence of τn that Willie chooses, the detector is asymptotically useless as
n→∞; that is, for any  > 0, there exists a construction such that PFA +PMD > 1−
for sufficiently large n.
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Analysis: Note that σ2j = Uζ, where U is a uniform random variable on [0, 1].
Recall that Willie does not know the value of U . Let PFA(u) and PMD(u) be Willie’s






≥ τn|U = u,H0
)
. (2.16)
Recall that χ2l denotes a chi-squared random variable with l degrees of freedom. Under








2n/n. By the weak law
of large numbers, χ22n/n converges in probability to 1; hence, for any δ > 0, ∃N0 (not










































∈ (σ2w + uζ − δ, σ2w + uζ + δ)) > 1− 2 . (2.19)
Therefore, PFA(u) ≥ 1− /2 for any τn < σ2w + uζ − δ. Likewise, following analogous











for any τn > σ
2
w + uζ + σ
2
a + δ. Define the set A = {u : σ2w + uζ − δ < τn <
σ2w+uζ+σ
2
a+δ}. This work establishes that, for any u ∈ Ac and any n > max(N0, N1),
PFA(u) + PMD(u) ≥ 1− 2 . The probability of event A is bounded as:
P (A) = P
(
τn − σ2w − σ2a − δ
ζ










Hence, choosing δ = ζ/8 and σ2a = ζ/4 yields:
P (Ac) ≥ 1− 
2
. (2.22)
Therefore, the summation of Willie’s false alarm and missed detection is lower-
bounded as:
PFA + PMD = EU [PFA(U) + PMD(U)] (2.23)
≥ EU [PFA(U) + PMD(U)|Ac]P (Ac) (2.24)
> 1− . (2.25)




a,w and remain covert from
Willie. Recognizing that the maximum interference caused by the jammer at Bob
can be upper-bounded and hence the received signal-to-noise ratio at Bob can be
lower-bounded by a constant, Alice can transmit O(n) bits in n channel uses covertly
and reliably to Bob.
2.3.2 Achievability for the Single Block Fading Model (M = 1)
Recall that there are four channels in the problem formulation: Alice-to-Bob,
Alice-to-Willie, jammer-to-Bob, and jammer-to-Willie. In this section, the channel
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model is expanded to consider the situation where one or more of the four channels
is a fading channel. As in Section 2.3.1, the problem is investigated by first charac-
terizing how the Alice-to-Willie and jammer-to-Willie channels constrain (or not) the
allowable scheme at Alice, in particular the power that she is able to employ while
remaining covert. The achievable performance under various metrics when Alice em-
ploys that power then follows classical information and communication theory based
on the nature of the Alice-to-Bob and jammer-to-Bob channels.
Consider first the case where the Alice-to-Willie channel is an AWGN channel and
the jammer-to-Willie channel is a M = 1 block fading channel. From an application
perspective, this appears at first to be a pessimistic case: the jammer who Alice is
counting on to confuse Willie is subject to fading, whereas Willie has a strong di-
rect path from Alice that makes the Alice-to-Willie channel comparatively benign
(AWGN). As in the case when all of the channels are AWGN, this work first demon-
strate that the optimal receiver at Willie is a power detector. Unlike in Section 2.3.1,
here the jammer can transmit Gaussian noise drawn from a distribution with constant
variance Pj = Pmax, since the channel randomizes the power received at Willie from
the jammer.
Lemma 3. Under the assumptions of the M = 1 block fading model in Section 2.2.1.2
and Alice’s construction presented in Section 2.2.1 but with the jammer transmitting
Gaussian noise drawn from a distribution with constant variance, Willie’s optimal
detector for detecting Alice’s transmission is to compare the total received power in
the slot of interest to a threshold.
Proof: Let ζ = Pj/d
α
j,w. The received jammer power σ
2
j is exponentially distributed
with mean ζ. As in Section 2.3.1, note that observations outside of k = 1, 2, . . . , n do
not help Willie to detect a transmission by Alice in slot t = 0; hence, it is sufficient to
consider Z0 as the input to Willie’s receiver. Therefore, the slot index is suppressed
and denote Willie’s observation conditioned on θ by Z(θ) = [Z1(θ), Z2(θ), . . . , Zn(θ)]
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where Zi(θ) ∼ CN (0, σ2w + θ). H0 and H1 are distinguished by introducing two non-










a)/ζ , σ2a < θ, ρ = 1,
0, otherwise.
(2.26)
Thus, Θ0 ≤lr Θ1 based on the assumptions presented in Section 2.2.2. The distri-












where z is as defined in Section 2.2.1.1. Hence, the LRT test is optimal based on the








The monotonicity of Λ(·) then follows from Lemma 1 by observing that, as in the
proof of Lemma 2, Z(θ) ≤lr Z(θ′) whenever θ ≤ θ′, and, as noted above, Θ0 ≤lr Θ1.
Thus, the LRT is equivalent to the power detector: Z ≷H1H0 Γn.
Next, consider the case when the Alice-to-Willie channel is also a M = 1 block
fading channel. In practice, Willie does not know the value of the fading coefficient
h
(a,w)
0,1 on this channel and, indeed, that is our assumption in our achievability result
below. However, since the achievability result for covert communication from Alice
to Bob is the main point of interest, giving Willie any extra knowledge (say, by a
genie) only strengthens the result. Therefore, this work assumes Willie knows h
(a,w)
0,1
and thus Corollary 3.1 is employed to establish Theorem 2.
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Corollary 3.1. Consider the assumptions of the single block fading model in Section
2.2.1.2 and assume that Willie knows the value of h
(a,w)
0,1 . Then, given Alice’s con-
struction in Section 2.2.1.1 but with the jammer transmitting Gaussian noise drawn
from a distribution with constant variance, Willie’s optimal detector for detecting a




0,1 and da,w, Willie knows σ
2
a, and the proof follows from Lemma
3.
Theorem 2. Under the assumptions of the single block fading model in Section
2.2.1.2, there exists a communication strategy for Alice, Bob, and the jammer whereby
Alice transmits with a power that does not decrease with the blocklength while remain-
ing covert from warden Willie.
Proof: This proof follows along the lines of Theorem 1 and is provided in Appendix
A.
2.3.3 The Number of Covert Bits Transmitted Reliably
Theorem 2 establishes that Alice can transmit with power not decreasing in the
blocklength n while maintaining covertness. In the case of AWGN channels on both
the Alice-to-Bob and jammer-to-Bob channels, the covert and reliable communication
of O(n) bits in n channel uses can be achieved. However, when the Alice-to-Bob
or jammer-to-Bob channels are M -block fading channels, M ≥ 1, the problem is
analogous to the standard problem of communication over slowly fading channels [37,
Section 5.4]. Strictly speaking, reliable communication as defined in Section 2.2.2 of
O(n) bits is not possible. In particular, if Alice transmits nR0 bits for any given
constant R0 > 0, there always exists some nonzero probability, not diminishing in n,
that the instantiations of |h(a,b)0,m | and |h(j,b)0,m |, m = 1, 2, . . .M , leads to a received signal-
to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) such that the communication is not reliable.
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However, the presence of the jammer, which allows Alice to transmit at per-symbol
power Pf > 0 not dependent on n (versus O( 1√n) power per symbol when there is no
jammer [12]), greatly improves system performance even in the case when the Alice-
to-Bob or jammer-to-Bob channels are M -block fading channels. This can be seen
via multiple metrics. First, if the metric of Section 2.2.2 is still of pertinent interest,
covert and reliable communication of o(n) bits is possible, as demonstrated for M = 1
in Appendix B. Second, and probably of more interest, is that the analog of the -
outage capacity (see [37]) is non-zero, whereas it would be zero for any transmission
power at Alice that decreases to 0 as n→∞.
2.3.4 Achievability Proofs for M > 1 Block Fading Channel Models
Here, consider the case of an M > 1 block fading channel on the jammer-to-Willie
link. In contrast to the results of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 for the AWGN and M = 1
block fading channels on the Alice-to-Willie link, respectively, a power detector is
not the optimal detector for Willie. Instead, an important property of the optimal
detector in Lemma 4 is established: that, if a given vector of observed powers for the
M blocks encompassing a slot results in a point on the boundary between Willie’s
decision regions, an increase in any component of that vector results in a decision of
H1. Whereas this does not explicitly identify the optimal receiver, it does guarantee
an important property of the dividing “curve” between the two decision regions: for
any given M − 1 components of the vector of observed powers, there is at most one
solution for the remaining component that falls on this curve between H0 and H1, as
defined precisely below. In particular, this is then sufficient to establish the result of
interest: that Alice can transmit covertly at power that does not decrease with the
blocklength n.
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2.3.5 Properties of the Optimal Detector at Willie
With t = 0 the slot of interest, observations outside of k = 1, 2, . . . , n do not
help Willie detect transmissions by Alice in slot t = 0. Therefore, the slot index is
suppressed, and denote Willie’s observations by Zˆ = [Zˆ1, Zˆ2, . . . , Zˆn]. Conditioned on
the fading coefficients on the jammer-to-Willie channel, measurements within each
fading block of length n/M are i.i.d., but the measurements from different blocks
come from different distributions determined by the sequence of block fading variables.














































2 , . . . , h
(j,w)
M ] is the vector of (complex) fading coefficients on
the jammer-to-Willie channel, zm =
∑n/M












j,w and Z = [Z1, Z2, . . . , ZM ], where Zm =
∑n/M
i=1 |Zˆ(m−1) nM +i|2 is the power
measured in the mth block. The distribution of the vector Z of received powers across


































































































The LRT in (2.33) shows that Z forms a sufficient statistic for the optimal test for
Willie to determine whether Alice transmits in that slot or not. Lemma 4 then
establishes that Λ(·) is monotone increasing in each of its components.
Lemma 4. Consider the assumptions of the multiple block fading channel model
in Section 2.2.1.2 and Alice’s construction presented in Section 2.2.1 but with the
jammer transmitting Gaussian noise drawn from a distribution with constant vari-
ance. When the Alice-to-Willie channel is AWGN and the jammer-to-Willie channel
is faded, Λ(Z) is monotonically increasing in each of the components of Z.
Proof: Λ(Z) (defined in (2.28)) monotonically increases in Z in the M = 1 case as
shown in Appendix C. The proof then follows from the observation that Λ(Z) in the





Corollary 4.1. Consider the assumptions of the multiple block fading model in Sec-
tion 2.2.1.2 and Alice’s construction presented in Section 2.2.1.1 but with the jammer
transmitting Gaussian noise drawn from a distribution with constant variance. Ad-
ditionally, assume that Willie knows h
(a,w)
0,m ,m = 1, 2, . . . ,M . When fading exists on
both the jammer-to-Willie channel and the Alice-to-Willie channel, then the likelihood
ratio Λ(Z) is monotonically increasing in each of the components of Z.
Proof: Conditioned on Willie’s knowledge of h
(a,w)
0,m ,m = 1, 2, . . . ,M , the channel
from Alice-to-Willie is an AWGN channel with a different signal power for Alice per
block; hence, the result follows similarly to that of Lemma 4.
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2.3.6 Covertness with Transmit Power not Decreasing in the Blocklength
Next, Lemma 4 is leveraged on the structure of the optimal receiver at Willie to
demonstrate the ability for Alice to employ power not decreasing in the blocklength for
the case where there exists M > 1 block fading on the jammer-to-Willie channel. The
general concept of the proof is similar to Theorem 1: demonstrate that the optimal
detector at Willie works poorly on a set of fading instantiations of the jammer’s signal
that has high probability.
Before outlining the proof, a number of regions are defined that characterize
Willie’s detector. Recall that a sufficient statistic for Willie’s optimal detector is
given by Z = [Z1, Z2, . . . , ZM ], where Zi is the power measured in the i
th block. A
normalized version corresponding to the average observed power per symbol within




, i = 1, 2, . . .M . A detector for Willie is defined by the regions
RH0(n) and RH1(n), each in RM , where H0 is chosen if X ∈ RH0(n), and H1 is chosen
if X ∈ RH1(n). For the optimal detector at Willie, as given in (2.33), a vector x is
in RH1(n) if and only if Λ(
n
M
x) > γ; otherwise x is in RH0(n). Hence, define the
boundary curve dividing RH0(n) and RH1(n) as C(n) = {x : Λ( nMx) = γ}. Finally,
define a boundary region, RδB(n) as the set of points that are within distance δ in at
least one dimension from the dividing curve between the regions.




j,2, . . . , σ
2




w[1, 1, . . . , 1].
Note that σ2j is random, since it depends on the fading from the jammer to Willie,
whereas σ2w is deterministic and known to Willie. The proof then proceeds, as fol-
lows. Given the instantiation of the block fading values between the jammer and
Willie, which determines the expected jammer power per symbol σ2j,i for the i
th fad-









a (under H1). The proof then begins with Lemma 5, which lever-
ages Lemma 4 to show that the probability of fading instantiations that result in
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Figure 2.4. An example diagram of decision regions for an arbitrary detector under
M = 2 block fading conditions. X1 and X2 are the normalized power measurements
in the first and second block respectively. The solid line (−) represents the boundary




w ∈ RδB(n) can be made arbitrarily small by choosing δ small enough; hence,
the probability that the jamming is such that the average power received per symbol
when Alice is not transmitting is in the boundary region can be made arbitrarily
small. The theorem then follows by considering what happens for the (highly proba-
ble) event that the instantiation of the block fading values yields σ2j +σ
2
w /∈ RδB(n); in
this case, for σ2a sufficiently small, the probability of missed detection or the probabil-
ity of false alarm is near one. Hence, Alice can employ power that does not decrease
with n and still achieve covertness. Essentially, Willie is not able to set a boundary
curve that works for a large set of σ2j , and thus his detector is only effective in the
unlikely event that σ2j +σ
2
w is near the boundary curve between his decision regions.
Lemma 5. Under the assumptions of the multiple block fading model in Section
2.2.1.2, for Willie’s optimal detector, with RδB(n) as defined above, there exists δ > 0
s.t. P (h : σ2j + σ
2
w ∈ RδB(n)) <  for any  > 0.
Proof: Consider solving for the values (if there are any) of xm, the m
th component
of the vector x = [x1, x2, . . . , xM ], for which x ∈ C(n), with the other components
fixed. By Lemma 4, for a given [x1, x2, xm−1, xm+1, . . . xM ], it is known that the
set of xm such that x ∈ C(n) consists of no points or a single point. Define the
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(M − 1)-dimensional vector x∼m = [x1, x2, . . . , xm−1, xm+1, . . . , xM ] as the vector x
with the mth component removed and define the following function on this vector,
which specifies the xm on the boundary (if there is one) when the rest of the elements
of x are set to the values in x∼m:
gm(x∼m) =
 0, no xm s.t. x ∈ C(n)xm, a single xm s.t. x ∈ C(n). (2.35)




{x : xm ∈ (gm(x∼m)− δ, gm(x∼m) + δ)}. (2.36)
Now, applying a union bound yields:
P (σ2j + σ
2













































Noting that supx fσ2j,1+σ2w(x) is finite, a choice of δ = /(2M supx fσ2j,1+σ2w(x)) yields
P (h : σ2j + σ
2
w ∈ RδB(n)) < .
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Theorem 3. Consider the assumptions of the multiple block fading model and Alice’s
construction in Section 2.2.1 but with the jammer transmitting Gaussian noise drawn
from a distribution with constant variance. Then, there exists a communication strat-
egy for Alice, Bob, and the jammer whereby Alice transmits with a power that does
not decrease with the blocklength while being covert from Willie.
Proof: Consider a covertness criterion PMD + PFA > 1 − . By Lemma 5, choose
δ > 0 s.t.:
P (h : σ2j + σ
2




If the Alice-to-Willie channel is AWGN, choose constant Pf > 0 such that σ
2
a < δ.
If the Alice-to-Willie channel is a M ≥ 1 block fading channel, choose Pf > 0 such
that the average received power from Alice is less than δ for all fading blocks with
high probability. We proceed with the proof for the case when the Alice-to-Willie
channel is AWGN, but the modifications for when the Alice-to-Willie channel is a
M ≥ 1 block fading channel follow similar steps to those shown in the second part of
the proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix A.
Consider an optimal detector at Willie for blocklength n, with associated decision
regions RH0(n) and RH1(n). First, a sketch of the proof idea is presented. Consider
the case where σ2w + σ
2
j ∈ RH0(n) \ R2δB (n). If Alice is employing σ2a < δ, the
probability of Willie’s test result being in RH1(n) occurs with small probability for
large n, regardless of whether H0 or H1 is true. Thus, Willie’s PMD is large and PFA
is small. Likewise, if σ2w + σ
2
j ∈ RH1(n) \ R2δB (n), then Willie’s PFA is large and PMD
is small for large n.
The rigorous proof is the vector extension of that of Theorem 2. Recall that
[σ2j,1, σ
2
j,2, . . . , σ
2
j,M ] is an i.i.d. vector, where each component is exponentially dis-












PFA(u) = P (X ∈ RH1(n)|σ2j + σ2w = u, H0). (2.44)









, i = 1, 2, . . . ,M , where {χ22n
M
,i
, i = 1, 2, . . . ,M} is an
i.i.d. collection of (central) chi-squared random variables, each with 2n/M degrees of
freedom. By the weak law of large numbers, each converges in probability to 1; since















































Now, if maxi=1,2,...,M σ
2











Thus, if u ∈ RH1 \R2δB (n), then P (X ∈ RH1) > 1− 2 and




Next consider any u ∈ RH0\R2δB (n). Then, recalling σ2a < δ, the vector u+σ2a[1 1 . . . 1]
cannot have any element within δ of C(n). Then, following analogous arguments to
those above, ∃N1 s.t. for n ≥ N1,




for u ∈ RH0 \R2δB (n) whenever maxi=1,2,...,M σ2j,i ≤ c. Thus, unless
A = {u ∈ R2δB (n)} ∪ { max
i=1,2,...,M
σ2j,i > c} (2.51)
occurs,
PFA(u) + PMD(u) > 1− 
2
. (2.52)
By construction, P (A) < /2, and thus
PFA + PMD = EU [PFA(U) + PMD(U)] (2.53)
≥ EU [PFA(U) + PMD(U)|Ac]P (Ac) (2.54)
> 1− . (2.55)
The implications on reliable throughput are then analogous to those discussed in
Section 2.3.3.
The implications of a constant transmit power at Alice on reliable throughput are
then identical to those discussed in Section 2.3.3 for M = 1 and the proof is presented
in Appendix D.
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2.4 Relationship with Steganography
Steganography is the discipline of hiding messages in innocuous objects. Typical
steganographic systems modify fixed-size finite-alphabet covertext objects into stego-
text containing hidden information, and are subject to a similar square root law (SRL)
as non-jammer assisted covert communication: O(√n) symbols in size n covertext
may safely be altered to hide an O(√n log n)-bit message [43]. As explained in [12],
the mathematics of statistical hypothesis testing are responsible for both SRLs while
the extra log n factor is from the lack of noise in the steganographic context. How-
ever, arguably the earliest work on SRL shows that it is achievable without the log n
factor when an active adversary corrupts stegotext with AWGN [44]2. That being
said, [45] shows that, because Alice in the steganographic setting has write-access to
covertext, the SRL can be broken and O(n) bits can be embedded in size n covertext
using careful selection of the subset of the covertext to be overwritten [45]. Thus, un-
like the scenario considered here, breaking the steganographic SRL does not require
Willie to be uncertain about the distribution of his observations.
2.5 Summary
This chapter investigated the addition of a Jammer to the Alice, Bob, Willie model
in such a way that the jammer creates uncertainty at Willie’s detector. By adding the
uncertainty at Willie, Alice and Bob can achieve covert and reliable communication
at a positive rate. In addition, a radiometer is proven to be an optimal detector
for Warden Willie under AWGN and single-block fading channel conditions. For the
multiple-block fading channel model a radiometer is not an optimal detector.
2We note that the results of [11] and [12] were developed independently of [44]. While [44]
provides the proof of the SRL when Alice is average-power constrained, [11] and [12] also develop
the achievability of SRL for the peak-power constained covert communication and the converse to
the SRL.
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The assumptions presented in Section 2.2.1.1 assume that the jammer is attempt-
ing to help Alice and Bob to communicate covertly. However, covert communication
may still be possible if an adversarial jammer is placed in the environment to actively
try to jam any potential communication by Alice, as is commonly done in electronic
warfare. For example, suppose that Willie uses a jammer to inhibit communication
by any party; then, whereas this jammer does indeed decrease the rate of any re-
liable (non-covert) communication, it may actually facilitate covert communication
by hurting Willie’s ability to determine if Alice is transmitting. In particular, if the
jammer-to-Willie channel is faded and Willie’s jammer transmits Gaussian noise, then
exactly the same interference model as derived for the constructions of Sections 2.3.2
and 2.3.4 applies. This enables covert communication from Alice to Bob in precisely
the same manner as in the case of a “friendly” jammer. Note that this assumes that
such a jammer generates random Gaussian noise; if that jammer instead generates a
noise-like signal that is decodable by Willie (say, using a Gaussian codebook shared
by the jammer and Willie), then Willie can conceivably decode the jammer’s signal
and subtract it from his received signal, subject only to the standard challenges of
successive interference cancellation in wireless communication environments.
2.6 Acknowledgment
The work in this chapter was sponsored by the National Science Foundation under
grants ECCS-1309573 and CNS-1564067.
41
CHAPTER 3
COVERT COMMUNICATION IN A DYNAMIC
ENVIRONMENT
3.1 Introduction
The block fading scenario described in Chapter 2 assumes that Alice, Bob, Willie
and the jammer are stationary, but are in a dynamic environment that causes a finite
number of variations over the duration of a codeword. For example, in a dynamic
urban environment, there are many people, vehicles, buildings and other objects which
contribute to a noisy wireless environment.
The block fading model scenario described in Chapter 2 borrowed from standard
models in the communications literature without a careful consideration of how these
dynamics might fit various covert communication environments of interest. Here,
motivated by the wide range of possible environments of interest, we take a more
general look at how the rate of covert communications depends on the dynamics of
the environment that Willie observes. In the dynamic model, the jammer does not
vary his power and there is no variation in the path loss between transmitter-receiver
pairs. The variations any receiver observes is due to the movement of additional
nodes or objects in the environment.
In particular, the dynamic model considered in this chapter is based on the sce-
nario shown in Figure 3.1. Assume that there are additional nodes or objects in the
environment that move; however, Alice, Bob, Willie and the jammer are stationary.
These additional nodes can either represent individual objects or users with no de-
sire to assist Alice or Willie. Therefore, the fading variations on the Alice-to-Willie
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channel and the fading variations on the jammer-to-Willie channel are dependent on
the movement of the additional nodes in the environment. Define n as the codeword
length and f(n) as the number of fading variations that occur over the duration of a
codeword.
Figure 3.1. Dynamic scenario where Alice, Bob, Willie and the jammer are sta-
tionary. The red dots represent additional objects in the environment that move and
cause fading variations at Bob and Willie’s receivers.
Depending on the nodes’ rate of movement, we are able to make some conclusions
about Alice’s ability to communicate reliably to Bob while remaining covert from
Willie based on prior covert communications research. For example, if f(n) = n,
prior work by Bash et al. in [12] suggests a conjecture as to Alice’s ability to maintain
reliable covert communication to Bob without risking detection by Willie. In partic-
ular, if new fading coefficients cause variations in every symbol slot, then potentially,
variations in each symbol slot could be averaged out to form an accurate estimate
of the null hypothesis statistics, and we expect to be able to achieve O(√n) bits of
covert transmission in n channel uses (and no more). Alice’s covert communication
capabilities are also known when f(n) is finite. Chapter 2 showed that Alice can
achieve O(n) covert bits in n channel uses in this case.
There is also the extreme case when the number of variations are so small that
f(n) < 1. In this scenario, the movement of the additional nodes causes very little
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variation over multiple codeword lengths. For example, assume Willie observes L
time slots each with codword length n and that Alice may or may not transmit
in a single time slot. The fading variation is so slow that Willie observes the same
fading coefficient across multiple time slots. This scenario resembles the results shown
by Goeckel et al. in [23]. Willie may not know in which time slot Alice transmits;
however, he can estimate the channel by using his observations over all T (n) time
slots. This result proves that Alice can transmit only O(√n) bits in n channel uses
if she desires covert and reliable communication.
A visual representation of Alice’s covert rate for f(n) < 1, finite f(n) and f(n) = n
is shown in Figure 3.2. It is not known what Alice’s covert rate is when f(n) is not
finite and scales with n. This chapter investigates this to determine the covert com-
munication capabilities and considers situations in which f(n) lies in the unresearched
region by considering dynamic environments.
Figure 3.2. Alice’s covert communication capabilities based on the number of varia-
tions due to fading, f(n), per codeword length n. † was a conjecture based on results
in [12] and was not proven prior to work presented in this dissertation.
The main contribution in this chapter is the derivation of the converse. If Alice
transmits with power ω(1/
√
f(n)) then Willie can detect her communications with
high probability as n→∞ where ω(·) represents little omega notation.
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3.2 System Model
Consider Alice (“a”) would like to communicate reliably to Bob (“b”) without
Willie Warden (“w”) detecting her communications. A jammer (“j”) is present in the
environment and assume that Alice, Bob, Willie and the jammer are stationary. Let
da,w and da,b denote the distance from Alice to Willie and Alice to Bob respectively.
Similarly, let dj,w and dj,b denote the distance from the jammer to Willie and Bob
respectively. There are NU additional users in the environment that do not transmit.
However, the additional nodes move in such a way that their movement impacts any
fading channels from Alice-to-Willie and Alice-to-Bob as well as any fading channels
from the jammer-to-Bob and jammer-to-Willie. Note that although Alice, Bob, Willie
and the jammer are stationary, the results in this work extend if any of them are
moving. They are assumed stationary to simplify notation. There are limits to the
distances from Alice to Willie and from the jammer to Willie. The jammer cannot
be too far away, otherwise the range of uncertainty at Willie’s receiver is reduced.
Alice cannot be too close to Willie, otherwise the Alice’s power that Willie observes
may be much larger than the range of uncertainty that Willie observes due to the
jammer. In such cases, Alice is limited to the SRL. Therefore, when Alice is too close
to Willie, the impact of the jammer on the model is negligible.
If Alice chooses to transmit, she first maps her message to a Gaussian codeword
f = [f1, f2, . . . , fn] such that E[|fk|2] = Pmax. As shown in Figure 3.3, Alice then
transmits her codeword in slot t = 0 which corresponds to the symbol slots k =
1, 2, . . . , n. The jammer transmits a complex signal {gt}T/2−1−T/2 in the time slots where
gt = [gtn+1, gtn+2, . . . , gtn+n] is the jammer’s signal in the t
th time slot with the power
constraint E[|gk|2] = Pmax.
The jammer-to-Willie channel is a fading channel and assume the Alice-to-Willie
channel is an AWGN channel as a pessimistic case. The jammer’s signal at Willie
fades in and out, however, Willie maintains a constant observation of Alice’s signal
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Figure 3.3. Dynamic slot model diagram where each block contains n symbol slots
and f(n) fading variations in each time slot. x refers to either Alice or the jammer
and y is either Willie or Bob.
if she chooses to transmit. This approach is similar to the modeling employed in
Section 2.3.2. The additional nodes in the environment do not transmit, but move in
such a way that the fading coefficients on the jammer-to-Willie channel vary. Instead
of specifying the effect of each individual node on the power Willie observes from
the jammer, assume the collective effect of all the nodes generates a new fading
coefficient every n/f(n) symbol slots on the jammer-to-Willie channel as shown in
Figure 3.4. Modeling new fading coefficients every n/f(n) symbol slots may at first
glance appear similar to the M -Block fading model in Chapter 2.3.2 and Chapter
2.3.4. However, this dynamic scenario models the fading variations as a function
of n which invalidates portions of the proof used to prove that positive rate covert
communication is achievable in Chapter 2. Portions of the proof in Chapter 2 relied
on the fact that the number of fading variations was finite whereas that is not the
case when f(n) is a function of n.
When Alice does not transmit, Willie observes:










Figure 3.4. Dynamic slot model diagram of a single time slot where each mth block
contains n/f(n) symbol slots.
where h
(j,w)
m is the fading coefficient between the jammer and Willie in the mth block
and N
(w)
k are independent and identically distributed zero mean Gaussian complex
random variables with variance E[|N (w)k |2] = σ2w.
If Alice decides to transmit, she first maps her message to the symbols f =
{f1, f2, . . . , fn} using a Gaussian codebook and transmits fk in each kth symbol slot
with the power constraint E[|fk|2] = Pf . Although the channel between the jammer
and Willie is a fading channel, this work assumes for now that the channel between
Alice and Willie is AWGN. Therefore, Willie’s observation when Alice transmits is:
H1 : zˆ mn
f(n)


























where Γn is Willie’s threshold which depends on n. To generalize Willie’s test, Willie







where τn is the threshold used to model the asymptotic behavior of Willie’s test as
n→∞.
3.3 Converse Proof
Define S = Z/n as Willie’s measurement used in his test.
Theorem 4. Under assumptions of the channel model and the construction given
in Section 3.2, then as n → ∞, if Alice transmits with power ω(1/√f(n)), either
Willie detects her with high probability or Bob cannot decode her messages with low
probability of error.






















E[|hk|2]E[|gk|2] + E[|N (w)k |2], (3.8)
= n(Pj + σ
2
w) (3.9)
where (3.9) follows because E[|hk|2] = 1 and E[|gk|2] = Pj. To compute the variance









(|hk|2|gk|2 + hkgkN∗k + h∗kg∗kNk + |Nk|2)
















kNl] + E[|Nk|2]E[|Nl|2]. (3.11)
E[Z2|H0] is simplified further by analyzing the individual terms of (3.11) separately.
The first term of (3.11) is simplified by considering the different possible cross-
products when: 1) k = l; 2) the symbols in the same fading block are cross product
terms
(






− 1] and l 6= k
)
; and 3) when symbols that are not in the
same fading block are cross products of each other
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= 4nP 2j +
2n2P 2j
f(n)
+ 2f(n)P 2j − 2nP 2j
+ n2P 2j −
n2
f(n)
P 2j , (3.14)
= 2nP 2j +
n2P 2j
f(n)
+ 2f(n)P 2j + n
2P 2j . (3.15)
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Equation (3.12) simplifies since E[|hk|4] = 2, E[|gk|4] = 2P 2j , and E[|gk|2|gl|2] = P 2j
for k 6= j. Therefore, the variance of Willie’s test result when Alice does not transmit
is:








2σ4w − nσ4w + 2nP 2j +
n2P 2j
f(n)
+ 2f(n)P 2j + n









The second and third terms of (3.11) do not have cross-product terms, hence,










E[|Nk|2]E[|hl|2]E[|gl|2] = 2n2Pjσ2w. (3.19)







































= n(2σ2w + (n− 1)σ4w), (3.22)
= 2nσ2w + n
2σ4w − nσ4w. (3.23)
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After normalizing Willie’s power measurement, the expected value of his normal-
ized measurement when Alice does not transmit is:
E[S|H0] = Pj + σ2w (3.24)

















Implementing analogous steps (shown in Appendix E), the expected value of Willie’s
normalized measurement is:
E[S|H1] = Pj + σ2w + Pf (3.26)

















Now, consider the case when f(n) < n and assume that Willie sets his threshold
such that he chooses the null hypothesis for any observation less than σ2w+t+Pj. Willie
then chooses the alternative hypothesis for any observation greater than σ2w + t+ Pj.
Therefore, when Alice does not transmit, Willie’s probability of false alarm is defined
as:
PFA = P0(S > σ2w + Pj + t) (3.28)
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where P0(·) refers to the pdf of Willie’s measurement S when Alice does not transmit.
Employing Chebyshev’s inequality [46, Equation 3.32], the probability of false alarm
is bounded:























Equation (3.31) follows because
P 2j
f(n)
is the dominant term in (3.30) since all other
terms go to zero as n → ∞ for f(n) < n. Furthermore, assume Willie defines
t = d/
√
f(n), for some constant d.
Willie misses Alice’s communication if his observation, S, is less than σ2w + Pj + t
when Alice transmits. Thus, Willie’s probability of missed detection is:
PMD = P1(S < σ2w + Pj + t), (3.32)
≤ P1(|S − σ2w − Pj − Pf | > Pf − t), (3.33)
≤ Var[S|H1]











is the dominant term in Var[S|H1]. The covert criteria requires
that Willie’s probability of error satisfies the constraint PFA + PMD ≥ 1/2−  where
 is small. However, if Alice transmits with power that is ω(1/
√
f(n)), then PFA +
PMD goes to zero as n → ∞ and the covert criteria is not satisfied. As a result,
Alice’s throughput cannot transmit ω(n/
√
f(n)) covert bits reliably in n channel
uses, otherwise, she risks Willie detecting her with low probability of error.
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3.4 Summary
This chapter builds upon the Alice/Bob/Willie/Jammer scenario presented in
Chapter 2 by considering a dynamic fading model. In Chapter 2, Alice’s ability
to communicate covertly and reliably in a fading channel environment is analyzed
for single block fading channels and the finite M -block fading channel model. This
chapter generalizes the fading and considers that the fading on the channel between
the jammer and Willie is a function of the total codeword length. Results prove that
if Alice’s transmit power is ω(1/
√
f(n)), then Willie’s probability of error converges
to zero as n→∞ and f(n)→ n.
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CHAPTER 4




Traditional digital communication analyses often model the signal at the receiver
with an equivalent discrete-time model. The discrete-time model is equivalent in the
sense that analyses and receiver operations based on it produce the same results as
those in the true continuous-time model. For example, consider the scenario shown in
Figure 4.1 where Alice communicates to Bob and Willie attempts to detect if Alice is
transmitting. Both the Alice-to-Willie and Alice-to-Bob channels are additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels.
Figure 4.1. Alice, Bob and Warden Willie model under AWGN channel conditions.
da,b and da,w represent the distance from Alice to Bob and Alice to Willie respectively.
Assume that Alice transmits to Bob as shown in Figure 4.2, where fk represents
the kth symbol that Alice transmits. Alice employs pulse shaping with the pulse
shape p(t). Denote N (b)(t) as the AWGN on the channel between Alice and Bob,
and define y(t) as Bob’s observation at his receiver which he then passes through a
54
matched filter. Bob then samples the filtered signal ymf(t) at the symbol rate, Tb,
and according to the timing offset τa. Bob then estimates fˆ1, fˆ2, . . . , fˆn as the original
message sent by Alice.
Figure 4.2. Alice to Bob communication diagram when Alice transmits BPSK
symbols.
For data decoding, Bob can model the end-to-end process shown in Figure 4.2
as an equivalent discrete-time model as long as his sampling of ymf(t) occurs at the
proper time instances. In particular, let y[n] = y(nTb) represent Bob’s observation in
the equivalent discrete-time model corresponding to the nth sample and assuming he
knows the timing offset τa:
y[n] = fn +W [n] (4.1)
where W [n] represents the noise from the channel and any system processes that
generate noise in the nth sample. We assume that Bob is capable of ascertaining τa
by sharing knowledge with Alice about their timing offsets along with their shared
codebook. Since Alice’s goal is to transmit symbols to Bob, the equivalent discrete-
time model focuses on Bob’s ability to estimate fn and does not model processes such
as pulse shaping in the model. Furthermore, the equivalent discrete-time model in
(4.1) can be used to exactly model the error rates between communicating parties [47,
Chapter. 10.1.2].
Early covert communication research presented by Bash et al. in [12] and subse-
quent work modeled both the Alice-to-Bob and Alice-to-Willie observations using a
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discrete-time model. Although there was no reference to the underlying continuous-
time model, the clear implication is that the discrete-time model captures the salient
characteristics of the underlying continuous-time model. Hence, the equivalent discrete-
time model is satisfactory for analyzing the communications between Alice and Bob,
but the equivalent discrete-time model for Willie’s channel is not designed to consider
all detectors that are available to Willie. Therefore, Willie’s model should allow for
the exploitation of any information available (or not) at his receiver which can assist
with detecting Alice’s communications.
The majority of covert communications research in the background Section 1.2
of this work assumes that Willie employs a power detector. Additionally, work pre-
sented in Chapter 2 of this dissertation demonstrates that a power detector is often
optimal for the equivalent discrete-time model. However, modeling Willie’s observa-
tions in the equivalent discrete-time model does not allow for the consideration of
various assumptions and of all potential detectors available to Willie. To consider a
broader range of detectors, a continuous-time model of Willie’s observations should
be implemented.
Thus, this chapter revisits the original covert communication model presented
in [12]. The work in Chapter 2 proves that a power detector is optimal for the
discrete-time model under AWGN and single block fading channel conditions. How-
ever, if Alice’s signal contains periodic features such as the example shown in Figure
4.2, cyclostationary detectors can outperform standard power detectors [25]. Since a
power detector is not always optimal depending on the type of periodic signal Alice
transmits, this leads to the question whether the classical “equivalent discrete-time
model” is in fact an equivalent discrete-time model for covert communications. This
chapter investigates this question.
In particular, human-generated signals do not resemble the random noise that oc-
curs in nature, as generated signals often have periodic features. Therefore, if Willie’s
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noise at this receiver resembles Gaussian noise (as in the system models of Chapter
2 and [12]), then any features in Alice’s transmission that do not resemble Gaus-
sian noise provides Willie with additional information to help detect Alice’s signal.
For example, consider the scenario presented in Figure 4.2 where Alice transmits her
message with pulse shaping.
The first scenario considered here is the Alice/Bob/Willie scenario and assumes
that Alice transmits a standard periodic signal. Periodic signals generate cyclic fre-
quencies which are defined as the frequency of the periodic feature of interest. Cy-
clostationary detectors (CSDs) are designed to exploit the periodicity of a signal by
attempting to measure the power observed at cyclic frequencies associated with the
signal of interest. This chapter compares Alice’s ability to communicate covertly if
Willie employs a CSD versus a power detector assuming Alice transmits a binary
phase shift keying (BPSK) signal. Before comparing the two detectors, a simple mo-
tivating example for a CSD is presented in Section 4.2 and further background is
provided on Gardner’s method used to construct CSDs. A CSD designed to detect
baseband BPSK signals and the detector’s statistics are discussed in section 4.3. The
Kullback−Leibler (KL) distance between the two hypotheses at the output of a cyclic
detector is then compared to the KL distance between the two hypotheses at the out-
put of a power detector. Results show that the CSD presented does outperform a
power detector of the full continuous-time model.
The main contributions in this chapter are:
1. The background of cyclostationary detectors is presented.
2. A CSD is proposed based on the continuous-time model instead of the equivalent
discrete-time model approximation, and a novel performance analysis of the
CSD is presented.
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3. Simulations and proofs are derived to demonstrate how well the cyclostationary
detector outperforms the power detector in the continuous-time model, suggest-
ing the discrete-time model must be employed cautiously in covert communica-
tions.
4.2 Constructing Cyclostationary Detectors
Gardner in [24] and [25] conducted extensive research on CSDs and demonstrated
that for very low signal-to-noise ratios that CSDs outperform power detectors. Gard-
ner also derived various CSDs based on the cyclostationary properties of potential
signals of interest (e.g. BPSK, QAM, length of pulse, etc.) in [26] and [27]. Since
Gardner’s early work, additional CSD variations have been presented. For example,
Zeng et al. in [48] derived CSDs that require less computational processing power
while still outperforming power detectors. However, the basic design process of a
CSD follows similar procedures to that of Gardner.
Let z(t) represent the observed signal at Willie. Willie’s goal is to determine if
he is observing noise or the sum of noise and a signal with periodic behavior at his
receiver. If Willie wants to use a CSD, he first makes a certain computation on z(t),
and we let v(t) represent the result of this computation. If z(t) is cyclostationary, then
v(t) also exhibits cyclic behavior. However, if z(t) does not contain a periodic signal,
then v(t) does not exhibit any cyclic features. Therefore, once v(t) is computed, the
power at the cyclic frequencies of interest in v(t) are measured and a threshold test
is used to determine if a cyclic signal corresponding to the frequencies of interest
(e.g. the baud rate of Alice) are present.
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4.2.1 The Intuition Behind Cyclostationary Detectors: A Sinusoid Ex-
ample
Before presenting the mathematical basis of Gardner’s work, this sub-section pro-
vides a simple motivating example to demonstrate how CSDs may outperform power
detectors when the signal-of-interest contains periodic features.
Consider the Alice, Bob, Willie scenario shown in Figure 4.1. Assume Willie
observes the period of time [0, T ] and his goal is to determine if Alice transmitted
during his observation. Let N (w)(t) represent Willie’s noise which is a zero-mean
Gaussian random process with power spectral density SN(w)(f) = σ
2
w. If Alice chooses
to transmit, Alice transmits x(t) = cos(2piFct) during the time period T , where Fc
is the carrier frequency. Let p represent the probability of Alice transmitting and
assume p = 1/2.
Define z(t) as Willie’s observation:
z(t) =

N (w)(t), Alice does not transmit
x(t) +N (w)(t), Alice transmits.
(4.2)
A typical power detector measures the power observed in z(t) and compares the










The CSD examples that are presented are simulated in Matlab. Therefore, an over-
sampled discrete representation is used in the following steps instead of continuous-
time notation. Denote z[n] = z(nTs) as the sampled version of z(t) where Ts is
the sampling period. Let RZ(n, τ) represent the autocorrelation function (ACF) of
Willie’s observation at sample n and with lag τ :
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RZ(n, τ) = E
[
z[n]z[n− τ ]]. (4.4)
For simplicity in this subsection, the ACF is only computed for τ = 0. Denote
RZ|H0(n, 0) as the (time-varying) zero-lag ACF of Willie’s observation when Alice
does not transmit and RZ|H1(n, 0) as the (time-varying) zero-lag ACF when Alice
transmits.
Then, define FZ|H0 as the Fourier transform of RZ(n, 0) when Alice does not
transmit
FZ|H0 = F{RZ|H0(n, 0)} (4.5)
where F represents the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) over the cyclic frequency
range α = {−N/2,−N/2 + 1, . . . , N/2 − 2, N/2 − 1}, and N is the number of sam-
ples observed. Each frequency in FZ|H0 is called a cyclic frequency because active
frequencies in FZ|H0 are related to the cyclic features which occur in z[n].
Simulations were generated to provide a visual representation of the mathematical
expressions described in this section. The simulations represent Willie’s observations
due to Alice transmitting a cosine signal at frequency Fc = 2.5 MHz with an oversam-
pling rate of 100 MHz. The signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of Alice’s signal at Willie’s
receiver is 0 dB. Therefore, both Willie’s noise and the power of Alice’s transmitted
signal are σ2w = 0.5. Then FZ|H0 is generated in Matlab using 1024 discrete samples
and the length of the DFT is also set to 1024. |FZ|H0| is shown in Figure 4.3 which has
a peak when the cyclic frequency is zero and is small for all other frequency values.
The behavior of FZ|H0 is expected because Willie only observes real Gaussian noise
at his receiver when Alice does not transmit. Note that in Figure 4.3 results, the lag
is fixed and the DFT is computed over the result of the ACF when there is zero lag.
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Figure 4.3. Cyclostatinary detector null hypothesis DFT observations. DFT of
RZ|H0(n, 0), |FZ|H0|, when Alice does not transmit.
Similarly, define FZ|H1 as the Fourier transform of RZ|H1(n, 0) when Alice trans-
mits. |FZ|H1| is shown in Figure 4.4 and there are peaks at frequencies that correspond
to −2Fc = −5MHz and 2Fc = 5MHz in addition to the peak observed at α = 0.
A power detector is equivalent to employing Willie’s observations at α = 0. A
threshold detector chooses a threshold to minimize the false alarm rate and maximize
the rate of correct detection based on observations in FZ|H0(α = 0) and FZ|H1(α = 0).
Similarly, a CSD would observe the power at either −2Fc or 2Fc and determine
a threshold to minimize the rate of error for the CSD detector. The ratio of the














Therefore, if Alice transmits a cyclostationary signal with small power, it is easier for
her to “hide in the noise” of a power detector than for her to hide her cyclic features
when Willie employs a CSD depending on her original transmit power.
In this section, a power detector is compared to a simple CSD when Alice trans-
mits a sinusoid. The CSD presented only considers the spectral content in the auto-
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Figure 4.4. Cyclostatinary detector alternative hypothesis DFT observations. DFT
of RZ|H1(n, 0), |FZ|H1|, when Alice transmits.
correlation function of z[n] when there is no lag. However, considering the average
spectral density function of the autocorrelation function with varying delay values
τ (i.e. RZ(n, τ)) can provide a more thorough analysis. The following Section 4.2.2
presents the mathematical framework for CSDs in more detail.
4.2.2 Classical Cyclostationary Detectors
This subsection provides a brief description of the mathematical basis used to
construct CSDs. Section 4.2.1 only provided a high-level perspective of CSDs, whereas
this subsection presents the mathematical framework based on William Gardner’s
work in detail [24].
Define RZ(t+ τ/2, t− τ/2) as the ACF of an observation z(t) with lag τ
RZ(t+ τ/2, t− τ/2) = E[z(t+ τ/2)z(t− τ/2)]. (4.6)
As shown in Section 4.2.1, if z(t) is cyclic then the Fourier transform of the ACF is
non-zero for cyclic frequencies other than α = 0.
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Since RZ(·, ·) is periodic in t, RZ(·, ·) can be represented as a Fourier series





where {α} represents the set of cyclic frequencies that are active in RZ(t+τ/2, t−τ/2)
and RαZ(τ) is the Fourier coefficient of cyclic frequency α defined as:






z(t+ τ/2)z(t− τ/2)e−i2piαtdt. (4.8)
Rαz (τ) is also called the cyclic autocorrelation function at cyclic frequency α. The
cyclic frequencies which occur in Rz(t + τ/2, t − τ/2) are the result of any periodic
behavior in z(t) such as a carrier frequency as shown in Section 4.2.1. Cyclic frequen-
cies are also generated by the symbol rate and other instances in which periodicity
may be present.
The next step in the design of a CSD calculates the power observed at the Fourier
coefficient corresponding to the cyclic frequency α for various τ values. Define Sαz (f)






Observing (4.9), Sαz (f) is the power spectral density of R
α
z which is calculated by
averaging Rαz over all potential values of τ . In the cyclostationary literature, S
α
z (f) is
called the spectral correlation function or the cyclic spectral density function. Equa-
tion (4.9) is a generalization of the high level example presented in Section 4.2.1. The
main differences between the high level example and (4.9) is that Section 4.2.1 only
considers when τ = 0.
Depending on the cyclic nature of the signal z(t), there are optimal (α, f) pairs to
employ when constructing cyclostationary detectors [24–27]. For example, if z(t) is
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a BPSK signal transmitted on a carrier frequency Fc, the peaks of S
α
z (f) associated
with the cyclostationary behavior of z(t) occur at ( 1
Tb
, Fc), (2Fc, 0), (2Fc± kTb , 0), (2Fc±
k
2Tb
, 0) where Tb is the symbol period of the pulse and k ∈ Z.
4.3 Covert Rate of a BPSK Cyclostationary Detector
This section presents a CSD designed to detect Alice’s communication when she
transmits a baseband BPSK signal. The CSD presented in this section differs from
the BPSK detector described in Gardner [24, Chapter 3.6]. Gardner’s BPSK detector
assumes that a carrier signal is present whereas this work assumes Alice transmits
at baseband. Once the CSD statistics are derived, the KL distance between the
statistics when Alice does and does not transmit is derived as well. The results of the
KL distance of the CSD are then compared to the KL distance of a power detector.
Results show that the KL distance of the CSD is larger than the KL distance of a
power detector. Monte Carlo simulations are included to support the derivation of
the CSD statistics by generating Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves.
4.3.1 System Model
Consider the Alice, Bob, Willie model where Alice would like to communicate
to Bob without Willie detecting her communications as shown in Figure 4.1. The
parameters da,w and da,b represent the distances from Alice to Willie and from Alice
to Bob respectively.
Willie’s goal is to detect if Alice communicates over the time period t ∈ [0, T ]. If
Alice does not transmit, Willie observes real Gaussian noise N (w)(t) at his receiver
with power spectral density σ2w. If Alice transmits, she first encodes her message
into BPSK symbols f = [f1, f2, . . . , fM ] where M is the number of symbols and







where p(t) is the square root raised cosine pulse and Tb is the symbol rate. Note that
fk is only non-zero for k ∈ [1, . . . ,M ] and assume that Alice transmits such that her
entire message is transmitted during Willie’s observation over [0, T ].
Let zpre(t) represent Willie’s observation:
zpre(t) =

x(t) +N (w)(t), Alice transmits
N (w)(t), else,
(4.11)
for t ∈ [0, T ]. Analogously, let y(t) represent Bob’s observation:
y(t) =

x(t) +N (b)(t), Alice transmits
N (b)(t), else,
(4.12)
where N (b)(t) is the noise Bob observes his receiver which is a zero-mean Gaussian
process with power spectral density σ2b.
4.3.2 Deriving the CSD Statistics
Assume that Willie has knowledge of his receiver noise statistics as well as prior
knowledge of Alice’s transmission scheme including the symbol period Tb; however,
he naturally does not know Alice’s symbol timing and thus cannot employ a matched
filter sampled at the proper time instances. However, Willie can detect if there is
power observed at cyclic frequency 1/Tb by employing a CSD. Thus, a cyclic detector
designed to detect cyclic frequencies at α = 1/Tb is presented in this section. The
BPSK detector presented by Gardner is not used in this work because we assume a
baseband signal. Willie’s CSD presented in this section is also simpler than Gard-
ner’s proposed detector; however, the proposed detector follows a strategy similar to
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Gardner’s BPSK detector. An outline of the detector employed in this work is shown
in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5. Willie’s Cyclostationary Detector of baseband BPSK signals.
Willie observes the signal zpre(t) at his receiver which is his pre-filtered observation.
Willie then passes zpre(t) through a wideband low-pass filter (LPF) with bandwidth W
and W is chosen such that W >> α = 1/Tb. The bandwidth is limited to reduce the
noise entering the quadratic non-linearity, the importance of which is demonstrated
in the noise analysis below. Willie then squares his filtered observation z(t):
v(t) = z2(t). (4.13)








A cosine transform represented by F in Figure 4.5 is employed since Willie’s obser-
vations are strictly real. Therefore, depending on whether Alice transmits or not, the





(x(t) +N(t))2 cos(2piαt)dt, Alice transmits∫ T
0
N2(t) cos(2piαt)dt, Alice does not transmit.
(4.15)
where the superscript representing Willie’s noise is dropped for convenience from here
forward. Willie then measures the magnitude observed at cyclic frequency F (α =
1/Tb) to decide if Alice transmitted or not.
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We now conduct a detailed analysis leveraging the wideband nature of the noise
N (w)(t) relative to the bandwidth 1/T at the output of the frequency detector. First
consider the H0 case when Alice does not transmit. Under H0, assume F (α) is a real










from some constant c, and (4.18) is true because
∫ T
0
cos(2piαt)dt is small relative to
the variance for large T . Note that, if N (w)(t) were truly white noise, c = ∞, but
in reality N (w)(t) is very wideband relative to 1/T . The variance of F (α|H0) when
Alice does not transmit is:















E[N2(t)N2(s)] cos(2piαt) cos(2piαs) dt ds. (4.21)
The expected value of the product of four jointly Gaussian random variables is given
by:
E[N1N2N3N4] = E[N1N2]E[N3N4] + E[N1N3]E[N2N4]
+ E[N1N4]E[N2N3]− E[N1]E[N2]E[N3]E[N4]. (4.22)
Thus,




where RN(τ) is the ACF of Willie’s noise and τ is the delay term. By employing

















































































where the steps in (4.24)-(4.28) follow the same steps in Appendix A of [49]. The first
term in (4.25) goes to zero because
∫ T
0
cos(2piαt)dt ≈ 0, (4.26) follows from the half-
angle formula trigonometric identity, (4.27) follows from the sum-difference formula
and (4.28) is simplified by the assumption that RN(τ) ≈ 0 for τ >> 1/W . The last
two terms in (4.28) go away because
∫ T
0





In (4.29), σ˜2w = 2Wσ
2
w represents the noise power Willie observes after the low pass
filter with bandwidth W .
The probability density function (pdf) of F (α) when Alice does not transmit is
approximated as an AWGN random variable:
PCSD,0 , N (0, σ˜4wT ). (4.30)
Define S = F (α)/T as the normalized observation of Willie’s power measurement
over the length of time T . The pdf of S when Alice does not transmit is defined as:































which represents the last two terms in (4.33) and assume n0 follows an additive white







































x(t)x(s)E[N2(t)N(s)] cos(2piαt) cos(2piαs) dt ds. (4.39)
The first term in (4.39) is equivalent to the variance under H0 (4.21). The “signal





































































Note that (4.41) is slightly different from prior work in [49] because Alice transmits
at baseband in this work. Equation (4.42) follows from employing the half-angle
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cos(4piαs)ds = 0. Pf represents the power observed in the symbols that Alice
transmits. The last term in (4.39) goes to zero because when t 6= s, E[N2(t)N(s)] = 0
and when t = s, E[N3(t)] = 0.
Since we assume n0 is AWGN, the distribution of F (α) under H1 is modeled as:




x2(t) cos(2piαt)dt and we assume that Willie is capable of computing
ρ. If Willie normalizes his measurement by the length of time T , the statistics of his
observation are defined by:












A threshold detector is employed to determine if Willie’s measurement S is classified
as either the null or alternative hypothesis. Define γ as Willie’s chosen threshold.
Willie’s probability of false alarm is then defined as the probability that his observa-
tion S is greater than γ when Alice does not transmit.
PFA = P (|S| > γ|H0) , (4.51)
= P (S > γ|H0) + P (S < −γ|H0) , (4.52)


















where (4.53) follows because P (S|H0) is centered at zero. Equation (4.55) follows










where µ is the mean and σ is the standard deviation of any normal pdf fS(s). (4.55)
is then written in terms of the complementary error function, erfc(·), because Matlab









Similarly, the probability of true detection, PTD, for any threshold γ is:
PTD = P (|S| > γ|H1), (4.58)
= P (S < −γ|H1) + P (S > γ|H1), (4.59)
= 1−Q












































Simulations were conducted in Matlab to verify that the derived statistical ap-
proximations match Monte Carlo simulations. Pseudocode which outlines the Matlab
script is presented in Appendix F. Five-hundred iterations of both the null hypothesis
and the alternative hypothesis were generated using the same noise seed to maintain
consistency. As described in the System Model of Section 4.3.1, Alice transmits BPSK
symbols with a square root raised cosine pulse with roll-off factor 0.2. Alice’s symbol
frequency is 1/Tb = 0.699 MHz. Since the simulations are generated in Matlab, the
discretized version of Willie’s observations are employed to model Willie’s detector
statistics and the oversampling rate is set to 100 MHz. Willie’s detectors observe
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4096 discrete samples. The CSD measures the power observed in F (α = 1/Tb) and
his standard power detector measures the power in the discretized version of z(t).
From [51], define S = 1
N
∑N−1
n=0 z[n]z[n] as the power detector test where z[n] is
Willie’s observation at discrete sample n and N is the total number of discrete samples
observed by Willie. S is AWGN when Alice does not transmit; thus, the statistics of
S when Alice does not transmit is:







where σ˜2w represents the noise power Willie observes after filtering his original obser-
vation. Analogously, the statistics of Willie’s power detector when Alice transmits
is:
P (S|H1) = N
(
σ˜2w + Pf ,






The CSD and the power detector results are analyzed by employing Receiver
Operating Characteristics (ROCs). ROCs demonstrate the efficiency of detectors by
plotting the probability of true detection versus the probability of false alarm [39,
Chapter 3.4]. Ineffective detectors generate results where the probability of true
detection is equal to the probability of false alarm. Figure 4.6 shows the ROC results
when Alice’s signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at Willie’s receiver prior to the low-pass filter
is -16 dB. The simulated results of the CSD and the power detector are shown along
with the theoretical statistical performance of the detectors. As shown in Figure 4.6,
the CSD significantly outperforms the power detector. These results demonstrate the
importance of Willie designing detectors that exploit any unique features that may
occur in Alice’s transmitted signal. Note that the effective noise bandwidth must be
carefully analyzed in simulations since a low pas filter is employed.
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Figure 4.6. ROCs comparing the performance of a CSD and a power detector when
the ratio of the power in Alice’s signal to the noise power at Willie is -16 dB. The back
line with the circle marker ( • ) corresponds to the known statistical performance rate
of the power detector and the dashed orange line (−−) corresponds to the simulated
detector results of the power detector. The black line with triangle markers ( 4 )
corresponds to the simulated ROC results of the CSD and the blue line (−) represents
the derived performance rate based on the statistics of CSD derived in Section 4.3.2.
4.3.4 Kullback-Leibler Distance
The Kullback-Leibler (KL) distance of two Gaussian random variables p0 and p1


































where tr(·) represents the trace of a matrix in (4.64). Let DPD = D(PPD,0||PPD,1)
denote the KL distance between the null and alternative statistics of a power detector
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Figure 4.7. ROCs comparing the performance of a CSD and a power detector when
the ratio of the power in Alice’s signal to the noise power at Willie is -18 dB. The back
line with the circle marker ( • ) corresponds to the known statistical performance rate
of the power detector and the dashed orange line (−−) corresponds to the simulated
detector results of the power detector. The black line with triangle markers ( 4 )
corresponds to the simulated ROC results of the CSD and the blue line (−) represents
the derived performance rate based on the statistics of CSD derived in Section 4.3.2.











































Analogously, let DCSD = D(PCSD,0||PCSD,1) represent the KL distance between the





















Removing the common terms in the KL distance of the power detector (4.68) and
the KL distance of the CSD (4.69), the term of interest in the power detector KL
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Figure 4.8. ROCs comparing the performance of a CSD and a power detector when
the ratio of the Alice’s SNR at Willie is -20 dB. The back line with the circle marker
( • ) corresponds to the known statistical performance rate of the power detector and
the dashed orange line (−−) corresponds to the simulated detector results of the power
detector. The black line with triangle markers ( 4 ) corresponds to the simulated
ROC results of the CSD and the blue line (−) represents the derived performance





































The classic Alice/Bob/Willie scenario considered in [1] is revisited in this chapter
under the assumption that Alice transmits a baseband BPSK signal on a continuous-
time channel. A cyclostationary detector (CSD) at Willie is proposed to detect Al-
ice’s signal when the channels between all entities are AWGN. The CSD detector
is designed using the continuous-time model of Willie’s observation instead of the
discrete-time model. The KL distance of the proposed CSD is compared against the
KL distance of a power detector. The KL distance results along with simulated results
verify that the CSD outperforms the power detector and demonstrate that a power
detector is not an optimal detector for the continuous-time model. Additionally, the
equivalent discrete-time model is not an equivalent model because it does not allow
for the consideration of all of Willie’s observations at his receiver to help him detect
Alice’s transmissions.
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CHAPTER 5
COVERT COMMUNICATION ON THE
CONTINUOUS-TIME MODEL: TIMING OFFSET
DETECTORS
5.1 Introduction
Chapter 4 investigates the original Alice/Bob/Willie scenario and demonstrates
the importance of considering the continuous-time model instead of the standard
discrete-time model when analyzing covert communication. As another way to demon-
strate the importance of considering continuous-time models, this chapter revisits the
scenario presented in Chapter 2, which considered the discrete-time model. Per Chap-
ter 2, Alice can communicate at a rate that does not scale with her codeword length
when there is a jammer in the environment that adds uncertainty to Willie’s observa-
tions. The uncertainty is added by either the jammer varying his/her power when the
jammer-to-Willie channel is AWGN or when there is a fading channel between jam-
mer and Willie which causes variations in the power Willie receives from the jammer.
Alice leverages Willie’s uncertainty to achieve covert communication at a positive
rate.
The discrete-time model presented in Chapter 2 essentially assumes that trans-
missions arriving from Alice to Willie and arriving from the jammer to Willie are
synchronized at Willie’s receiver and that Willie samples at the symbol rate at the
perfect time. In reality, timing offsets between Alice and the jammer are highly prob-
able since they each use different hardware and are geographically separated without
coordination. Although a jammer with varying transmit power in an AWGN channel
may cause uncertainty in a power detector, the timing offsets provide Willie with
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a unique feature that might mitigate any uncertainty in his received power. These
features are not observable in the discrete-time model, but they are present in the
continuous-time model.
The main contributions of this chapter are:
1. The considering of timing offsets and the presentation of a detector at Willie
that is capable of detecting Alice based on her timing offset from the jammer.
2. A proposed method to overcome the timing offset detector by allowing Alice to
vary her timing offset when she transmits.
5.2 System Model
Consider the scenario presented in Figure 5.1 where Alice would like to commu-
nicate covertly and reliably to Bob without Warden Willie detecting her communi-
cations. An uninformed jammer is also present in the environment and transmits
with the same construction as Alice. In Figure 5.1, dx,y represents the distance from
a transmitter to a receiver where x is either Alice (“a”) or the jammer (“j”) and y
represents Willie (“w”) or Bob (“b”).
Figure 5.1. Wireless communication scenario with Alice, Bob, Willie and a jammer.
Define H0 as the null hypothesis which represents Willie’s assumption that Al-
ice did not transmit. Let H1 represent the alternative hypothesis which represents
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Willie’s assumption that Alice transmitted. Assume Willie observes M time slots
each of length T , as shown in Figure 5.2. The jammer transmits n binary phase shift
keying (BPSK) symbols v(s) = {v(s)1 , v(s)2 , . . . , v(s)n } in slot s. The jammer transmits
v(s) by pulse shaping the symbols with a square root raised cosine (SRRC), which
is represented by p(t). The jammer transmits with constant power that is limited
to some maximum value, E[|v(s)k |2] = Pmax. Define τj as the timing offset between
the jammer’s symbol time and time zero at Willie’s receiver and assume that τj is





k p(t − kTb − τj) where Tb is the symbol period and ζ is the scaling
coefficient used to control the power of the jammer’s signal observed at Willie. As-
sume further that Willie is capable of estimating the timing offset τj with minimal
error by observing all M slots.
If Alice chooses to transmit, she encodes her message into BPSK symbols f =
{f1, f2, . . . , fn} in slot s = 0. Define τa as the timing offset between Alice’s pulse p(t)
generated at her receiver and time zero. Also assume Alice’s symbol period is the
same symbol period employed by the jammer, Tb. Alice’s transmitted signal is then
x(t) = λ
∑n
k=1 fkp(t− kTb − τa) where λ is the scaling coefficient used to control the
power of Alice’s signal observed at Willie and E[|fk|2] = Pmax.
Figure 5.2. Continuous-time slot model diagram where each block contains the time
period T and there are M total slots that Willie observes.
Consider Willie’s observations in the time slot s = 0 and assume that from here
forward, all variables apply to the time slot s = 0; thus, the index of the slot is





vkp(t− kTb − τj) +N (w)(t) (5.1)
where N (w)(t) is the noise Willie observes at his receiver which has mean zero and
power spectral density S
(w)
N (f) = σ
2




fkp(t− kTb − τa) + ζ
n∑
k=1
vkp(t− kTb − τj) +N (w)(t). (5.2)
If Willie employs a power detector at this point in his receiver, the detector
computes the measured power observed in z(t) and compares the measurement to










Since Alice and the jammer employ the same symbol spacing, a cyclostationary de-
tector designed to detect frequencies at 1/Tb as might be suggested in Chapter 4 has
difficulty differentiating between the jammer’s transmissions and Alice’s transmission.
In either the case of a power detector or a cyclostationary detector, Alice can still
achieve a covert rate that does not decrease in the block length n. Thus, this chapter
considers a detector at Willie that exploits the timing offsets τa and τj.
An outline of the system model is shown in Figure 5.3. Willie first passes his
observation through a matched filter. Define zmf(t) = z(t) ∗ p(−t) as the matched
filter’s result:
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fkp(t− kTb − τa) + ζ
n∑
k=1







fkp(t− kTb − τa) ∗ p(−t) + ζ
n∑
k=1
vkp(t− kTb − τj) ∗ p(−t)




fkq(t− kTb − τa) + ζ
n∑
k=1
vkq(t− kTb − τj) + p(−t) ∗N (w)(t) (5.7)
where q(t) = p(t)∗p(−t) is the zero inter-symbol interference (ISI) raised cosine pulse.
Figure 5.3. Alice/Jammer/Willie scenario where Willie samples his observations at
both timing offsets τˆj and τˆa.
Willie has two branches after the matched filter. The first branch (Branch A)
captures the signal at Alice’s estimated offset and the second branch (Branch J)
captures the signal at the jammer’s estimated offset. We assume that Willie knows
the symbol period Tb and needs to form an estimate of the timing offsets for Alice
and the Jammer. Let τˆa and τˆj represent the timing offset estimates of Alice and the
jammer’s transmissions respectively. This work assumes that Willie can estimate the
jammer’s offset with minimal error by observing all M time slots. This assumption
is validated in simulation results shown in Section 5.3.1 and is based on the strategy
proposed by Goeckel et al. in [23].
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Let r(j) represent the sampled values on Branch J in Figure 5.3 and assume that
Willie observes N samples. Let r(a) represent the sampled values Willie observes on
Branch A which also contains N samples.







where IN×N is an N by N identity matrix because there is zero ISI between Alice’s
symbols in Branch A at Willie’s receiver. QN×N is an N by N matrix that models
interference from the jammer’s signal and n(a) represents the noise at Willie’s receiver.
The diagonal terms in QN×N correspond to interference from the jammer’s current
symbol given by q(|τˆa − τˆj|). The terms that are off the diagonal in QN×N model
interference from the neighboring symbols of the jammer’s message. The number of
neighboring terms that are non-zero around the diagonal depends on the pulse shape.
As an example, assume that the pulse shape is such that Willie observes appreciable
interference from three of the jammer’s symbols at the kth sample in r(a) and that all





k = λfk + ζ
[
vk−1q(|τˆa − τˆj| − Tb) + vkq(|τˆa − τˆj|)





If (5.9) is modeled in QN×N , the kth row has column entries [k − 1, k, k + 1] that are
non-zero and all other entries in the row are zero. Adjustments need to be made in
QN×N to the first few rows and last few rows of QN×N depending on the pulse shape
because only N symbols are observed on each branch.
Next, the noise contribution in Branch A is analyzed. N (w)(t) is a zero-mean


















2 , . . . , n
(a)
N are jointly Gaussian because linear operations on
Gaussian random processes result in jointly Gaussian random variables. The expected






p(t− kTb)E[N (w)(t)]dt (5.11)
= 0 (5.12)
where (5.12) follows because N (w)(t) is a zero-mean Gaussian random process. The






























where (5.15) follows because E[N (w)(t)N (w)(s)] = σ2wδ(t− s). The final result (5.16)
is due to the zero ISI property of the raised cosine pulse.









where Alice’s message now acts like an interferer and n(j) is an N × 1 vector which
represents the noise that Willie observes on Branch J. The expected value and the
correlation of the jointly Gaussian sequence n(j) are zero and δk,lσ
2
w respectively.
Willie’s observations r(a) and r(j) can be represented in matrix notation by stacking















One plausible detector measures the power observed only in r(a) which corresponds
to the time samples which contain Alice’s transmitted codewords. However, if the
jammer’s power is large, then the signal energy from the jammer’s signal “leaks”
into the observations Willie views in r(a). However, Willie can estimate the original







where b(a) is a N × 1 vector which represents Willie’s estimate of Alice’s symbols λf
and b(j) is a N × 1 vector which represents Willie’s estimate of Alice’s symbols ζv.
In particular, as long as A is full rank, which we show occurs if τa 6= τj, the
inversion is possible, with the power of the residual noise related to the condition
number of A. A well-conditioned matrix leads to less noise enhancement.
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Next, a simulation is implemented to study the condition number of A when p(t)
is the impulse response of the square root raised cosine pulse [53, Chapter 6.7.1]:
p(t) =










By employing the SRRC pulse, the combined response of the transmitter and match
filter is a raised cosine pulse which produces pulses that have zero intersymbol inter-
ference between the symbols (Nyquist Zero-ISI criteria) [30, Chapter 3.3.1].
Figure 5.4 plots the condition number of A versus the timing offset percentage
of Alice’s pulse and the jammer’s pulse, |τa − τj|/Tb. Figure 5.4 is generated by
assuming Willie obtains 400 samples to construct both r(a) and r(j). Therefore, A is
an 800 by 800 matrix that is constructed for various timing offsets between τa and τj.
The symbol period is 75 discrete samples, the SRRC pulse’s roll-off factor is .2 and
a Figure of the SRRC pulse is shown in Figure 5.5. The condition number results
show that A is reasonably well-conditioned when the timing offset between Alice and
the jammer is greater than 10%. However, the offset at which A is well-conditioned
depends on the pulse shape.
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Figure 5.4. Condition number of matrix A (5.19) versus the timing offset between
Alice’s pulse and the jammer’s pulse, (|τa − τj|/Tb)100.


















Figure 5.5. Simulated Square Root Raised Cosine (SRRC) pulse.
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5.3 Simulation Results of Willie’s Timing Offset Detector
5.3.1 Estimating Willie’s Timing Offset, τj
The system model presented in Section 5.2 assumes Willie can estimate the timing
offset τj. The process for such is outlined in this subsection. Since Willie has access to
M time slots, assume that Willie considers M − 1 slots and his initial assumption is
that Alice transmits in the M th slot. Willie can measure the power observed in r(j) for
various estimates of τj in each of the observed M−1 time slots. This method outlined
in this work is exhaustive simply to demonstrate the possibility of such an estimation,
but there are alternative methods to estimate the timing offset τˆj [47, Chapter 6.3].
Matlab simulations were generated to verify that this estimation process is pos-
sible. In simulations, the true jammer timing offset τj = 0 and Willie observes 1000
samples to construct r(j) for discrete-time offsets τˆj = {0, 1, 2, . . . , 50}. Figure 5.6
plots the power observed in r(j) for various τˆj values when the jammer-to-noise ratio
is -5 dB. The power measured in r(j) peaks when τˆj = 0, which is the true timing
offset. The simulation presented in Figure 5.6 and the symbol period is Tb = 70
discrete samples. However, even if the symbol spacing is smaller, Willie can still form
an estimate of the timing offset. Figure 5.7 shows the power measured in r(j) when
the symbol spacing between the jammer’s symbols is 16 discrete samples. Willie can
still form an estimate of τj to maximize his observation of the jammer’s signal.
5.3.2 Detecting Alice’s Signal
Based on results shown in Section 5.3.1, Willie can form an estimate of τj and
then perform detection. Therefore, the simulation results presented are under the
assumption that Willie is performing detection in a single time slot. Before presenting
Monte Carlo simulations, a single example is provided to justify measuring the power
observed in b(a) as a detector. Consider the same scenario presented in Section 5.3.1
with Willie’s timing offset τj = 0. The jammer transmits BPSK symbols that are
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Figure 5.6. Power measured in r(j) for different estimated timing offsets τˆj when
the jammer’s symbol period is 70 discrete samples and the jammer-to-noise ratio is
-5 dB.
















Figure 5.7. Power measured in r(j) for different estimated timing offsets τˆj when
the jammer’s symbol period is 16 discrete samples and the jammer-to-noise ratio is
-5 dB.
pulse shaped using a SRRC pulse and the symbol period is 70 discrete samples. Alice
also transmits BPSK symbols that have the same symbol period as the jammer and
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Alice’s true timing offset is τa = 30. The SNR is -5 dB and the SJR is 0 dB; therefore,
the jammer-to-noise ratio (JNR) is -5 dB as well.
In simulations, Willie uses 1000 samples to construct r(j) based on the estimated
timing offset τˆj and we assume Willie estimates τa as a next step. Willie can employ
a similar process used to estimate τj by measuring the power observed in r
(a) for
various estimates of τa. Figure 5.8 shows the results of Willie’s power observed in r
(a)
for various τˆa values based on 1000 samples to construct r
(a). The power measured in
r(a) peaks when τˆa = 30 discrete samples which is equivalent to a 42.8% timing offset.
Therefore, assuming Willie has access to sufficient resources, Willie can measure the
power observed in r(a) to estimate τa.

















Figure 5.8. Simulated power observed in r(a) ( ◦ ) when Alice transmits and the
timing offset between the jammer and Alice is 30 discrete samples (42.8% timing
offset). The power observed in r(j) when Alice does not transmit is also shown for
comparison.
Monte Carlo simulations are generated to construct ROC curves based on the
assumptions that Willie correctly estimates the timing offsets τˆj = 0 and τˆa = 30 dis-
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crete samples. 800 iterations are generated and in each iteration power measurements
of b(a) are calculated when Alice does and does not transmit. Figure 5.9 shows the
detection results when the SNR is -30dB, the SJR is -30dB and therefore the JNR
is 0 dB. Another ROC is shown in Figure 5.10 when the SNR is -30 dB, the SJR is
-10 dB and the JNR is -20 dB. The black line represents the standard power detec-
tor (5.3) and the blue line represents the timing offset based detector. These results
demonstrate that Willie can detect Alice’s transmissions with significantly greater
success than the power detector by exploiting features which differ between Alice and
the jammer.




























Figure 5.9. ROC detection results when Alice’s timing offset is constant, SNR=-
30 dB, SJR = -30 dB. The power detector (5.3) is represented by the black line (−)
and the timing offset based detector is represented by the blue line (4).
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Figure 5.10. ROC detection results of a power detector (5.3) represented by the
black line (−) and the detector of the timing offset based detector represented by the
blue line (4).
5.4 Adding Uncertainty to the Timing Offset Scenario
This section proposes a different communication strategy at Alice so that it is
harder for Willie to detect whether or not Alice is transmitting. The proposed method
is similar to frequency hopping techniques that are employed to avoid detection by
an adversary [30, Chapter 12].
Consider the system model presented in Section 5.2 and the timing slot model
shown in Figure 5.2. The jammer transmits BPSK symbols using pulse shaping in
all M time slots. Alice and Bob agree on a pre-assigned time slot to transmit which
is unknown to Willie. Without loss of generality, assume that Alice and Bob agree
to communicate in slot s = 0. In this section, Alice’s transmission scheme changes
such that she varies her timing offset instead of using a fixed timing offset. Also
assume that Bob knows how Alice varies her timing offsets prior to communicating.
Therefore, Alice’s signal is x(t) = λ
∑n
k=1 fkp(t− Tb − τa,k) where τa,k represents the
timing offset of the kth symbol. Note that Alice does not have to change τa,k after
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each symbol and the timing offset may be constant for a certain number of symbols
that are transmitted successively. Also, note that such a strategy results in Alice
incurring intersymbol interference (ISI) at Bob’s receiver; however, such ISI does not
affect the order of the scaling of the covert throughput.
Assume Willie’s proposed detector is designed to measure the power observed in
different timing offsets as shown in Section 5.2. This assumption is also true in the
simulations implemented in Section 5.3.2. Willie’s proposed detector measures the
power observed in b(a) as he varies his estimate of Alice’s timing offset observed at
his receiver for different estimates of her timing offset, τˆa.
Before generating Monte Carlo simulations, a simple simulation is generated to
demonstrate the benefits of Alice varying her timing offset. Assume that Alice varies
her timing offset so the timing offset between the jammer and herself at Willie varies
by 10, 20, 30 or 40 discrete samples. Alice randomly picks a new timing offset
after transmitting every 100 symbols and all timing offsets are chosen with equal
probability.
Following the steps outlined in Section 5.2, Willie constructs different sets of r(a)
by sampling his matched filter result with different timing offset values, τˆa. As an
example, Figure 5.11 plots the power Willie observes in r(a) for different τˆa values when
only Alice transmits. The results are generated assuming Willie uses 1000 samples
to construct r(a). Figure 5.11 also shows the power Willie observes when Alice’s true
timing offset at Willie is fixed τa = 30 for comparison. By varying her timing offset,
the power Willie observes in b(a) for any estimate τˆa is significantly reduced.
Next, Monte Carlo simulations were generated to observe the impact of Alice
varying her timing offset on Willie’s detection capabilities. Four detectors at Willie
were constructed which measure the power Willie observes in b(a) for τˆa = 10, 20,
30 and 40 discrete samples. Willie constructs r(a) and r(j) using 1000 samples. Alice
chooses a timing offset of 10, 20, 30 or 40 discrete samples every 100 symbols with
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Figure 5.11. Willie’s power in b(a) when Willie samples his observation at various
timing offsets and Alice does not vary her timing offset. The black line (–) represents
the power measured in b(a) when Alice’s timing offset is fixed at τa = 30 discrete
samples and the blue line ( 4 ) represents when Alice varies her timing offset by
10, 20, 30 or 40 discrete samples with equal probability. The signal to noise ratio at
Willie is -5 dB and the jammer does not transmit in the results shown.
equal probability. The symbol period employed by both Alice and the jammer is
Tb = 70 discrete samples.
The first simulation assumes Alice transmits with a fixed timing offset, τ = 30.
Figure 5.12 shows the ROC curves comparing the different detectors that are con-
structed based on different estimates of τˆa. As shown in Section 5.3.2, Willie’s detector
performs well when τˆa = 30 and his other detectors do not detect any signal at τˆa =
10, 20 and 40 as expected. Figure 5.13 shows the results of Willie’s detectors when
Alice varies her timing offset by 20 or 30 discrete samples with equal probability.
Note that although the detector with τˆa = 30 appears to outperform the detector
with τˆa = 20, these results are dependent on only 1000 samples. Thus, the perfor-
mance of the detectors are expected to perform similarly as Willie observes larger
sample sizes.
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Figure 5.12. ROCs of timing offset detectors when Alice’s offset is fixed, SNR =
-30 dB, SJR = -30 dB. Willie assumes Alice’s timing offset is fixed at τˆa =10 ( ◦ ), 20
( 4 ), 30 ( • ) or 40 (  ) discrete samples. Alice’s offset, τa, is fixed at 30 discrete
samples. Willie constructs r(a) and r(j) using 1000 samples.
Figure 5.14 shows the results of Willie’s detector when Alice varies her timing
offset by 10, 20, 30 and 40 samples with equal probability. The performance of each
detector is degraded further by the fact that Alice is varying her timing offset. The
pseudocode for the simulations presented in this section are detailed in Appendix G.
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Figure 5.13. ROCs of timing offset detectors when Alice’s timing varies slightly,
SNR = -30 dB, SJR = -30 dB. Willie assumes that Alice’s timing offset is fixed at
τˆa =10 ( ◦ ), 20 ( 4 ), 30 ( • ) or 40 (  ) discrete samples. The black line (−)
represents the performance of a power detector at Willie. Alice varies her offset by
either 20 or 30 discrete samples with equal probability. Willie constructs r(a) and r(j)
using 1000 samples.
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Figure 5.14. ROCs of timing detectors when Alice’s offset various significantly, SNR
= -30 dB, SJR = -30 dB. Willie assumes that Alice’s timing offset is fixed at τˆa =10
( ◦ ), 20 ( 4 ), 30 ( • ) or 40 (  ) discrete samples. The black line (−) represents
the performance of a power detector at Willie. Alice varies her offset by either 10, 20,




This chapter revisited the Alice/Bob/Willie/Jammer scenario presented in Chap-
ter 2 to investigate the impact of a detector designed based on the continuous-time
model instead of the discrete-time model. This is done by assuming that both Alice
and the jammer transmit BPSK signals and that the timing of the pulses are such
that the symbol boundaries are not aligned at Willie, as would be the case in prac-
tice. Simulation results demonstrate that if Alice’s timing offset is constant, Willie
can collect samples and project away from the jammer, thus mitigating its impact. If
Alice varies her timing offsets, she can mitigate such an attack at the expense of Bob’s
observations incurring intersymbol interference. Thus, the results provide general in-
sight about how Alice can achieve covert communication and how Willie can thwart
Alice’s ability to remain covert on the true continuous-time channel. Essentially,
Alice should transmit messages which resemble Willie’s expected background noise
statistics for all detectors. Analogously, Willie should leverage any unique features
about Alice’s transmissions that are different from his expected background noise to
design detectors.
5.6 Acknowledgment




CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The covert communication research presented in this work builds upon prior re-
search to consider dynamic channel models. The second chapter considered covert
communications with the addition of a jammer in the standard AWGN channel model,
with single block fading, or with a finite M -block fading model. Results prove that
Alice can achieve positive rate covert communication even when Willie employs an
optimal detector with the addition of the jammer. The third chapter generalizes the
covert communication problem to consider an arbitrary number of fading blocks over
the duration of Alice’s transmission. The number of fading variations is defined as a
potentially increasing function of the codeword length, and thus the number of fading
blocks is not finite as in Chapter 2. A converse for covert communication is provided.
Chapter 4 revisits the Alice/Bob/Willie covert communication scenario using the
continuous-time model instead of the previously considered discrete-time model. Re-
sults presented in Chapter 2 prove that a power detector is an optimal detector for
Willie for many discrete-time models, including AWGN and single-block fading. How-
ever, results in Chapter 4 demonstrate the importance of considering the continuous-
time model: the results derived based on the discrete-time model in Chapter 2 are only
valid if Willie samples his continuous-time observations at exactly the right time in-
stances. In particular, Chapter 4 demonstrates the importance of the continuous-time
model by presenting cyclostationary detectors and demonstrating how their perfor-
mance outperforms a standard power detector. This work demonstrates that limiting
Alice’s transmit power is not the only consideration. Alice’s transmissions should not
99
contain any features that differ significantly from Willie’s observations when Alice
does not transmit.
The Alice/Bob/Willie/Jammer scenario presented in Chapter 2 is revisited in the
fifth chapter under a continuous-time model. If Alice and the jammer are unsyn-
chronized, then Willie can exploit their relative time offsets to construct detectors
that significantly outperform a power detector and even change the scaling behav-
ior. However, if Alice varies her timing offset, she can reduce the chances of Willie
detecting her communications, in fact, causing the timing offset detector to perform
similarly as a power detector in the continuous-time model.
As covert communication research continuous to develop, the scenarios under
which covert communication are analyzed are also expected to become more complex.
Some areas of future work include:
1. Additional strategies Willie can exploit to detect Alice’s transmissions with high
probability. For example, if Willie employs an antenna array in the AWGN
channel model, even if the jammer transmits, Willie can differentiate between
the two transmitters by employing an antenna array. If Willie knows in advance
where the jammer is located, then Willie can use this knowledge to detect if
power observed from other directions is greater than some threshold. The work
presented in Chapter 3 provides some insight about what channel conditions
can generate uncertainty when Willie employs an antenna array.
2. Future work should also consider how well Bob can reconstruct Alice’s messages
under more dynamic channel conditions and when Alice changes her transmis-
sion strategy.
3. There is already some early work by Yan et al. in [54] which determine Alice’s
exact rate when her codeword length is finite. The proofs presented in this work
assume asymptotic conditions. Future work should also consider Alice’s exact
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PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Construction: Alice and the jammer employ the same methods as described in
the construction of Lemma 3 in Section 2.3.2. Hence, Willie is aware that the channel
gain between the jammer and himself results in σ2j being distributed as an exponential
random variable with mean ζ. If the Alice-to-Willie channel is AWGN, Lemma 3
establishes that the optimal receiver for Willie to employ is a power detector Z ≷H1H0 Γn







where τn ≡ Γn/n. If the Alice-to-Willie channel is an M = 1 block fading channel, we
assume pessimistically that Willie also knows the value of h
(a,w)
0,1 . Then, Corollary 3.1
establishes that the optimal receiver for Willie is again the power detector in (A.1).
Analysis: Consider first the case when the Alice-to-Willie channel is an AWGN chan-
nel. Recall that we require PFA +PMD > 1− for any  > 0. Thus, consider any  > 0.
The unboundedness of the support of σ2j requires a slight modification of the proof
technique of Theorem 1 in Section 2.3.1. Thus, note that there exists some constant
c such that:










≥ τn|σ2j = u,H0
)
. (A.3)






2n/n. By the weak law of large numbers, χ
2
2n/n converges











































∈ (σ2w + u− δ, σ2w + u+ δ)) > 1− 2 (A.6)
and thus PFA(u) ≥ 1 − /2 for any τn < σ2w + u − δ as long as u < c. Likewise,










for any τn > σ
2
w + u + σ
2
a + δ, as long as u < c. Combining these results yields that
for any n > max(N0, N1):




unless {u > c} or u ∈ A = {σ2w + u− δ < τn < σ2w + u+ σ2a + δ}. Now,






where the last line follows by upper bounding the probability density function of σ2j .
A choice of δ = ζ/16 and σ2a = ζ/8 yields, via the Union Bound:




and then the proof follows analogously to the end of that of Theorem 1. This com-
pletes the proof for the case that the Alice-to-Willie channel is an AWGN channel.
Next, consider the case when the Alice-to-Willie channel is a M = 1 block fading
channel. Let 2 > 0 be the covertness constraint and set  = 2/2. Choose σ˜
2
a
according to the AWGN case above such that Alice is covert if the average received
power at Willie is σ˜2a. Finally, choose Pf such that:






Then, Alice can employ (constant) power Pf and satisfy the covertness constraint for
any  > 0.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF o(n) COVERT BITS TRANSMITTED FOR
M = 1
Consider the assumptions of the M = 1 fading model and Alice’s construction
in Section 2.2.1.1 but with the jammer transmitting Gaussian noise drawn from a
distribution with constant variance. If fading channels exist between all parties, there
exists a covert communication strategy s.t. Bob can reliably decode Alice’s messages
if she transmits o(n) bits in n channel uses.
Proof: By Theorem 2, Alice can transmit with Pf > 0 not dependent on n
while remaining covert. What remains is to demonstrate that Bob can decode the
transmission with probability of error less than δ for any δ > 0. Conditioned on the









Hence, given the distributions of h(a,b) and h(j,b), there exists a constant rate R such
that the probability that γ is large enough to support communication with reliability
greater than 1 − δ
2
at rate R is greater than 1 − δ
2
(R is the δ
2
-outage capacity [37],
which is non-zero). Since o(n) < nR for all n > N0 for some N0, the result follows.
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF INCREASING Λ(Z) FOR THE M = 1 CASE
FOR THE PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Let ζ = Pj/d
α
j,w. Hence, in the fading model, the received jammer power σ
2
j is
exponentially distributed with mean ζ. As in Section 2.3.1, since the t = 0 slot is the
slot of interest, observations outside of k = 1, 2, . . . , n do not help Willie to detect
a transmission by Alice in slot t = 0. Hence, it is sufficient to consider Z0 as the
input to Willie’s receiver. As in Section 2.3.1, we therefore suppress the slot index
and denote Willie’s observation by Z = [Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn]. It is then readily established
that Z =
∑n
































































































































and consider the LRT when Willie observes z(0) + ∆:




























The common integration term in the numerator and denominator of (C.5) is extracted
to yield:
































































































































































































































If there exists such a c2 ∈ [σ2w + σ2a,∞), then:























































where (C.14) follows by noting that e−
∆
x is monotonically increasing in x and c2 >























































































where (C.17) follows from the assumption in (C.4). Hence, if an observation z(0) is
such that Λ(z(0)) = γ, then an increase in the observed power z results in Λ(z) > γ.
109
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF o(1) COVERT RATE FOR M > 1
Consider the assumptions of the multiple block fading model in Section 2.2.1.2
and Alice’s construction presented in Section 2.2.1.1 but with the jammer transmit-
ting Gaussian noise drawn from a distribution with constant variance. Additionally,
assume that Willie knows h
(a,w)
0,m ,m = 1, 2, . . . ,M . Then, there exists a covert commu-
nication strategy such that Bob can reliably decode Alice’s messages if she transmits
with rate o(1).
Proof: Construction: The construction is the same as for Lemma 5 and Theorem 3.
Analysis: By Theorem 3, Alice can transmit with constant power Pf > 0 while remain-
ing covert. What remains is to demonstrate that Bob can decode the transmission













Now, there exists a constant δ small enough such that:
P (γm > δ) ≥ 1− 
2M
(D.2)
for all m = 1, 2, . . .M . Hence, P (min(γ1, γ2, . . . , γM) > δ) > 1− 2 . Now, there exists
a constant rate R such that communication is reliable over an AWGN channel with
SINR δ; hence, communication at that rate R is reliable here. Finally, since o(1) < R
for all n > N0 for some N0, the result follows.
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APPENDIX E
WILLIE’S ALTERNATIVE STATISTICS WHEN ALICE
TRANSMITS
The derivations presented in this section are employed to characterize Willie’s
ability to detect Alice based on the system model presented in Section 3.2. Willie’s
expected test result when Alice transmits is:
E[Z|H1] = nPj + nσ2w + nPf . (E.1)
The term E[Z2|H1] is then evaluated to determine the variance of Willie’s observation:
























kNl] + E[|fk|2|fl|2]. (E.2)










E[|hk|2]E[|gk|2]E[|xl|2] = 2n2PjPf (E.3)





E[|fl|2]E[|Nk|2] + E[|fk|2]E[|Nl|2] = 2n2Pfσ2w. (E.4)
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kfl] = 2nPjPf (E.5)





























= 2nPf + n
2P 2f − nP 2f . (E.8)
Therefore, the full expansion of E[Z2|H1] is:
E[Z2|H1] = E[Z2|H0] + 2n2PjPf + 2n2Pfσ2w + 2nPjPf + 2nPfσ2w
+ 2nP 2f + n
2P 2f − nP 2f (E.9)
and the variance of Willie’s observation when Alice transmits is:




+ 2f(n)P 2j + n










2P 2f − nP 2f − n2P 2f









+ 2nPjPf + 2nPfσ
2
w + 2nPf − nP 2f , (E.11)
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based on the term:
(E[Z|H1])2 = n2(P 2j + σ2w + P 2f + 2PjPf + 2Pfσ2w + 2Pjσ2w). (E.12)
Therefore, the normalized measurement S has the expected value:
E[S|H1] = Pj + σ2w + Pf (E.13)



















PSEUDOCODE OF CYCLOSTATIONARY DETECTION
SIMULATIONS (SECTION 4.3.3)
% Declare Variables
Fs = 100e6 % Oversample frequency
Ts = 1/Fs % Oversample period
pulse % Load SRRC pulse
Tb = 143 % Discrete symbol period
alpha = 1/(Tb*Ts) % Declare symbol frequency
SNR % Declare alice’s SNR at willie
SJR % Declare alice’s SJR at willie
Nsym = 8192 % Number of symbols alice generates
% Detector Settings
N = 4096 % Number of samples Willie observes
time vec = (0:N-1)*Ts
max iterations % Declare max number of iterations
W = 20 MHz % Declare bandwidth
lpf = fir1(20,W/Fs) % Create low-pass filter
rng(0,‘twister’) % Initialize random generator seed
for each iteration ii=1:max iterations
bpsk = randn(1,Nsym) % Generate BPSK symbols
bpsk(bpsk>=0)=1
bpsk(bpsk<0)=-1
bpsk up = upsample(bpsk,Tb) % Space by symbol period
tx sig = conv(bpsk up,pulse) % Convolve with pulse
% Generate AWGN
noise = randn(1,length(tx sig))
noise = noise/sqrt(power(noise)) % Normalize noise power
Ps = power(noise)*10ˆ(SNR/10) % Find signal power
tx sig = tx sig/sqrt(power(tx sig)) % Normalize
tx sig = tx sig*sqrt(10ˆ(log10(Ps)) % Adjust signal power
z pre h0 = noise(1:N)
z pre h1 = tx sig(1:N) + noise(1:N)
z h0 = filter(lpf,1,z pre h0)
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z h1 = filter(lpf,1,z pre h1)
% Power Detector
power result h0(ii) = power(z h0)
power result h1(ii) = power(z h1)
% Cyclic Detector
cyc result h0(ii) = abs(sum(z h0ˆ2*cos(2 pi alpha t vec)))/N
cyc result h1(ii) = abs(sum(z h1ˆ2*cos(2 pi alpha t vec)))/N
end for loop
% Next, find power detection rates based on derived equations
% First find frequency at which the magnitude response of the
% filter is -3 dB.
[h, w] = freqz(lpf,1)
[v, p] = min(abs(20*log 10(abs(h))+3))




mu1 = Ps + Pnb
std pow0 = sqrt((Pnaˆ2*2)/N)*2
std pow1 = sqrt((Pnaˆ2*2+4*Ps*Pna)/N)*2
tau vec = linspace(0,max(power result h1),max iterations)
pow eq fa = 1-.5*erfc((-tau vec-mu0)/std pow0/sqrt(2))
+.5*erfc((tau vec-mu0)/std pow0/sqrt(2))
pow eq det = 1-.5*erfc((-tau vec-mu1)/std pow1/sqrt(2))
+.5*erfc((tau vec-mu1)/std pow1/sqrt(2))
% Cyclic detection rates based on derived equations
x = filter(lpf,1,tx sig(1:N))
rho = abs(sum(xˆ2*cos(2 pi alpha t vec)))/N
std csd0 = sqrt(Pnaˆ2/N)*2
std csd1 = sqrt((Pnaˆ2/N+2*Pna*Ps/Nˆ2))*2
tau vec = linspace(0,max(cyc result h1),max iterations)
cyc eq fa = erfc(tau vec./std csd0/sqrt(2))
cyc eq det = 1-.5*erfc((-tau vec-rho)./std csd1/sqrt(2))
+.5*erfc((tau vec-rho)./std csd1/sqrt(2))
% Generate simulated ROC results using power result h0 and
% power result h1
% Generate derived ROC results using pow eq fa and pow eq fa
% Generate simulated ROC results for cyc result h0
% and cyc result h1
% Generate derived ROC results using cyc eq fa and cyc eq fa
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APPENDIX G
PSEUDOCODE OF TIMING-BASED DETECTOR
SIMULATIONS (SECTION 5)
The code below outline’s Willie’s detector assuming Willie has already estimated
the jammer’s timing offset.
% Declare Variables
Fs = 100e6 % Oversample frequency
Ts = 1/Fs % Oversample period
pulse % Load SRRC pulse
Tb = 143 % Discrete symbol period
alpha = 1/(Tb*Ts) % Declare symbol frequency
SNR % Declare Alice’s SNR at Willie
SJR % Declare Alice’s SJR at Willie
Nsym = 8192 % Number of symbols Alice generates
% Detector Settings
N = 4096 % Number of samples Willie observes
time vec = (0:N-1)*Ts
max iterations % Declare max number of iterations
A % Construct A Matrix
rng(0,‘twister’) % Initialize random generator seed
for ii=1:max iterations
% Generate signals
g % Generate jammer’s bpsk pulse shaped signal with
% a fixed timing offset
x % Generate Alice’s bpsk pulse shaped signal
% and vary timing offset if needed
noise % Generate and normalize AWGN power
% Scale Alice’s signal power and jammer’s signal power
% according to SNR and SJR
% Match filter
mf h0 = conv(g+noise,pulse) % Willie’s H0 observation
mf h1 = conv(x+g+noise,pulse) % Willie’s H1 observation
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% Implement standard power detector here, then the
% timing based detector
% Downsample observation on jammer’s branch using τˆj
m % Find when first symbol should arrive if there
% are no timing offsets
rj h0 = downsample(mf h0(m+τˆj:end),Tb)
rj h1 = downsample(mf h1(m+τˆj:end),Tb)
% Downsample Willie’s observation with different
% estimated timing offsets for Alice
% Example code below for τˆa=10
ra h0 10 = downsample(mf h0(m+10-1:end),Tb)
ra h1 10 = downsample(mf h1(m+10-1:end),Tb)
% Calculate power in estimates and repeat process
% for τˆa=20,30,40
ba h0 10 = Aˆ[ra h0 10(1:N),rj h0 10(1:N)]
% measure power in ba h0 10
ba h1 10 = Aˆ[ra h1 10(1:N),rj h1 10(1:N)]
% measure power in ba h1 10
end for loop
% Generate ROC results for power detector results
% Generate ROC results for ba h0 10 and ba h1 10
% Generate ROC results for ba h0 20 and ba h1 20
% Generate ROC results for ba h0 30 and ba h1 30
% Generate ROC results for ba h0 40 and ba h1 40
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